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==The Processed Down Group BibTeX Records==
 
@article{anand2000structure,
title={The structure of licensing contracts},
author={Anand, Bharat N and Khanna, Tarun},
journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume={48},
number={1},
pages={103--135},
year={2000},
abstract={Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple 'facts' concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross-industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
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tags={},
}
@article{balasubramanian2011what,
tags={Strategic Behavior, Incentives for Innovation},
filename={Gilbert Newbery (1982) - Preemptive Patenting And The Persistence Of Monopoly.pdf}
}
 
@article{green1995division,
title={On the division of profit in sequential innovation},
author={Green, Jerry R and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
pages={20--33},
year={1995},
abstract={In markets with sequential innovation, inventors of derivative improvements might undermine the profit of initial innovators through competition. Profit erosion can be mitigated by broadening the first innovator's patent protection and/or by permitting cooperative agreements between initial innovators and later innovators. We investigate the policy that is most effective at ensuring the first innovator earns a large share of profit from the second-generation products it facilitates. In general, not all the profit can be transferred to the first innovator, and therefore patents should last longer when a sequence of innovations is undertaken by different firms rather than being concentrated in one firm.},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
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tags={},
}
 
@article{hayslett1995antitrust,
title={1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibition of Antitrust Law},
author={Hayslett III, Thomas L},
journal={J. Intell. Prop. L.},
volume={3},
pages={375},
year={1995},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
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tags={},
}
tags={genetic diagnostic testing, patent proliferation, research sector},
filename={Huys (2009) - Legal Uncertainty In The Area Of Genetic Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
 
@article{jaffe2000us,
title={The US patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process},
author={Jaffe, Adam B},
journal={Research policy},
volume={29},
number={4},
pages={531--557},
year={2000},
abstract={This paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the U.S., and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change. It also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy. Despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few. Possible reasons for these limited results are discussed, and possible avenues for future research are suggested. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
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tags={},
}
tags={Patent Pools},
filename={Joshi Nerkar (2011) - When Do Strategic Alliances Inhibit Innovation By Firms.pdf}
}
 
@inproceedings{kortum1998stronger,
title={Stronger protection or technological revolution: what is behind the recent surge in patenting?},
author={Kortum, Samuel and Lerner, Josh},
booktitle={Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy},
volume={48},
pages={247--304},
year={1998},
abstract={We investigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of U.S. patenting over the past decade. Conventional wisdom points to the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. We examine whether this institutional change, which has benefited patent holders, explains the burst in US. patenting. Using both international and domestic data on patent applications and awards, we conclude that the evidence is not favorable to the conventional view. Instead, it appears that the jump in patenting reflects an increase in U.S. innovation spurred by changes in the management of research.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
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tags={},
}
tags={RAND, Licensing, Patent Holdup, SSO},
filename={Lemley (2007) - Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards And One Not To.pdf}
}
 
@article{levin1987appropriating,
title={Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development},
author={Levin, Richard C and Klevorick, Alvin K and Nelson, Richard R and Winter, Sidney G and Gilbert, Richard and Griliches, Zvi},
journal={Brookings papers on economic activity},
volume={1987},
number={3},
pages={783--831},
year={1987},
abstract={},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
tags={Patent statistics},
filename={Marco Rausser (2008) - The Role Of Patent Rights In Mergers.pdf}
}
 
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
 
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999}
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
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tags={},
}
tags={Licensing, scientific research productivity},
filename={Murray Stern (2006) - When Ideas Are Not Free The Impact Of Patents On Scientific Research.pdf}
}
 
@article{Oecd1994measurement,
title={Using patent data as science and technology indicators},
author={OECD},
journal={OECD},
year={1994},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
tags={TRIPS, SPLT, WIPO, International, Patent Law},
filename={Reichman Dreyfuss (2007) - Harmonization Without Consensus.pdf}
}
 
@article{Scotchmer2008standing,
title={Standing on the shoulders of giants},
author={Scotchmer},
journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume={5},
number={1}
pages={29-41},
year={1991},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
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