PTLR Down Group Processed BibTeX
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This page contains the processed Down Group BibTeX entries.
The Processed Down Group BibTeX Records
@article{balasubramanian2011what,
Title={What Happens When Firms Patent? New Evidence From U.S. Economic Census Data},
author={Balasubramanian, Natarajan and Sivadasan, Jagadeesh},
journal={The Review of Economics and Statistics},
volume={93},
number={1},
pages={pp. 126-146},
abstract={We build a new concordance between the NBER Patent Data and U.S. Census microdata and use it to examine what happens when firms patent. We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze firsttime patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application. Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.},
year={2011},
publisher={The MIT Press},
copyright={Copyright © 2011 The MIT Press},
abstract={We build a new concordance between the NBER Patent Data and U.S. Census microdata and use it to examine what happens when firms patent. We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze firsttime patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application. Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={econometric},
industry={Manufacturing},
tags={Econometric data, manufacturing companies are better off when they patent vs. no patent},
filename={Balasubramanian Sivadasan (2011) - What Happens When Firms Patent.pdf}
}
@article{bargill2003thevalue,
title = {The Value of Giving Away Secrets},
author = {Bar-Gill, Oren and Gideon Parchomovsky},
journal = {Virginia Law Review},
volume = {89},
number = {8},
abstract = {},
language = {English},
year = {2003},
publisher = {Virginia Law Review},
copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Virginia Law Review},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
tags={Theory proving that inclusion and unprotected publication is the optimal strategy for all firms. Cumulative innovation is the result},
filename={BarGill Parchomovsky (2003) - The Value Of Giving Away Secrets.pdf}
}
@article{bessen2008value,
title={The Value of US Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics},
author={Bessen, J.},
journal={Research Policy},
volume={37},
number={5},
pages={932--945},
year={2008},
abstract={This paper uses renewal data to estimate the value of U.S. patents, controlling for patent and owner characteristics. Estimates of U.S. patent value are substantially larger than estimates for European patents, however, the ratio of patent value to R&D is only about 2%. Patents issued to small patentees are much less valuable than those issued to large corporations, perhaps reflecting imperfect markets for technology. Litigated patents are more valuable, as are highly cited patents. However, patent citations explain little variance in value. These estimates of patent value correspond to estimates of the contribution of patent rents to firm market value.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={General, Manufacturing},
tags={Patent Value, Firm Value, Rents},
filename={Bessen (2008) - The Value Of Us Patents By Owner And Patent Characteristics.pdf}
}
@article{blind2009influence,
title={The Influence of Strategic Patenting on Companies’ Patent Portfolios},
author={Blind, K. and Cremers, K. and Mueller, E.},
journal={Research Policy},
volume={38},
number={2},
pages={428--436},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier},
abstract={This paper analyses whether strategic motives for patenting influence the characteristics of companies’ patent portfolios. We use the number of citations and oppositions to represent these characteristics. The analysis is based on survey data from German companies, which are combined with EPO data covering applications from 1991 to 2000. We find clear evidence that the companies’ patenting strategies are related to the characteristics of their patent portfolios. First, companies using patents in the traditional way to protect their technological knowledge base receive a higher number of forward citations for their patents. Second, the motive of offensive – but not of defensive – blocking is related to a higher incidence of oppositions, whereas companies using patents as bartering chips in collaborations receive fewer citations and fewer oppositions to their patents.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Regression},
industry={German, general},
tags={strategic motives in patenting, effects on patent portfolios, offensive and defensive lead to different results},
filename={Blind Cremers Mueller (2009) - The Influence Of Strategic Patenting On Companies Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
@article{brenner2009optimal,
title={Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools},
author={Brenner, S.},
journal={Economic Theory},
volume={40},
number={3},
pages={373--388},
year={2009},
publisher={Springer},
abstract={Patent pools in the framework of Lerner and Tirole (2004) may enhance or reduce social welfare. The purpose of this paper is to devise a pool formation mechanism which prevents welfare decreasing pool equilibria to emerge, and which encourages welfare enhancing pool formation. In order to destabi- lize welfare decreasing pools, compulsory individual licensing (CIL) has been suggested. We show that in general, CIL is not an efficient antitrust tool. Welfare decreasing incomplete pools are weakly or even strongly stable to individual licensing. However, CIL under exclusive pool membership avoids stability problems of welfare enhancing pools, while it creates instability of welfare decreasing pools.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Model},
industry={General, ICT},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent pools have been proposed to solve this hold-up problem (Shapiro, 2001).},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Patent pools have been proposed to solve this hold-up problem (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={complementary patents, patent pools, },
filename={Brenner (2009) - Optimal Formation Rules For Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@article{calderini2004intellectual,
title={Intellectual Property Rights as Strategic Assets: The Case of European Patent Opposition in the Telecommunications Industry},
author={Calderini, M. and Scellato, G.},
journal={CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita'Bocconi, Working Paper},
volume={158},
year={2004},
abstract={The paper empirically investigates the phenomenon of patent litigation through the analysis of the all population of European patents’ opposition cases in the telecommunication industry. We recover the complete legal history of each dispute and the patent portfolios of the firms involved. We suggest that in an industry characterised by strong technological complementarities the distribution of patent rights may induce situations of mutual hold-up among innovators. The risk of retaliation through counter- suits represents a credible threat that can eventually favour the instauration of collusive behaviours. Our results confirm this hypothesis, since the occurrence of patent oppositions among large incumbents is significantly lower than industry average.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, summary statistics},
industry={Telecommunications, ICT},
thicket_stance={n/a},
thicket_stance_extract={n/a},
thicket_def={n/a},
thicket_def_extract={n/a},
tags={patent portfolios, strategic use of patents, retaliation risk},
filename={Calderini Scellato (2004) - Intellectual Property Rights As Strategic Assets.pdf}
}
@article{carnabuci2009knowledge,
title = {Knowledge Specialization, Knowledge Brokerage and the Uneven Growth of Technology Domains},
author = {Carnabuci, Gianluca and Bruggeman, Jeroen},
journal = {Social Forces},
volume = {88},
number = {2},
pages = {pp. 607-641},
abstract = {Why do certain domains of knowledge grow fast while others grow slowly or stagnate? Two distinct theoretical arguments hold that knowledge growth is enhanced by knowledge specialization and knowledge brokerage. Based on the notion of recombinant knowledge growth, we show that specialization and brokerage are opposing modes of knowledge generation, the difference between them lying in the extent to which homogeneous vs. heterogeneous input ideas get creatively recombined. Accordingly, we investigate how both modes of knowledge generation can enhance the growth of technology domains. To address this question, we develop an argument that reconciles both specialization and brokerage into a dynamic explanation. Our contention is that specializing in an increasingly homogeneous set of input ideas is both more efficient and less risky than brokering knowledge. Nevertheless, specializing implies progressively exhausting available recombinant possibilities, while brokerage creates new ones. Hence, technology domains tend to grow faster when they specialize, but the more specialized they become, the more they need knowledge brokerage to grow. We cast out our argument into five hypotheses that predict how growth rates vary across technology domains.},
year = {2009},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical, Fixed Effects Regression},
industry={ICT},
tags={knowledge specialization, specialization enhances knowledge growth at a declining rate, sequential innovation},
filename={Carnabuci Bruggeman (2009) - Knowledge Specialization Knowledge Brokerage.pdf}
}
@article{clark2008fragmented,
title = {Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D},
author = {Clark, Derek J. and Konrad, Kai A.},
journal = {Management Science},
volume = {54},
number = {5},
pages = {pp. 969-981},
abstract = {Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.},
year = {2008},
publisher = {INFORMS},
copyright = {Copyright © 2008 INFORMS},
abstract={Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms’ willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Model},
industry={General},
tags={Complementary Patents, Cummulative Innovation},
filename={Clark Konrad (2008) - Fragmented Property Rights And Incentives For R And D.pdf}
}
@techreport{cohen2000protecting,
title={Protecting their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)},
author={Cohen, W.M. and Nelson, R.R. and Walsh, J.P.},
year={2000},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
abstract={Based on a survey questionnaire administered to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1994, we find that firms typically protect the profits due to invention with a range of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of marketing complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities Of these mechanisms, however, patents tend to be the least emphasized by firms in the majority of manufacturing industries, and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most heavily.A comparison of our results with the earlier survey findings of Levin et al.[1987]sugest that patents may be relied upon somewhat more heavily by larger firms now than in the early 1980s.For the protection of product innovations, secrecy now appears to be much more heavily employed across most industries than previously Our results on the motives to patent indicate that firms patent for reasons that often extend beyond directly profiting from a patented innovation through either its comercialization or licensing.In addition to the prevention of copying,the most prominent motives for patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related inventions (i.e.,"patent blocking"),the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention of suits. We find that firms commonly patent for different reasons in "discrete" product industries, such as chemicals, versus "complex" product industries, such as telecommunications equipment or semiconductors. In the former, firms appear to use their patents commonly to block the development of substitutes by rivals, and in the later, firms are much more likely to use patents to force rivals into negotiations.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={General, Manufacturing},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={Our data do not show the degree to which patent portfolio races distort the nature of R&D incentives or lead to socially wasteful outcomes, or whether such portfolio races or patent thickets actually block entry. Nor do they indicate whether fee stacking or the breakdown of negotiations in complex technology industries have ever undermined the commercialization of innovation. The data do suggest, however, that the potential for such outcomes may be more pervasive than previously thought.},
thicket_def={def30},
thicket_def_extract={For example, the building of patent fences can be carried to the extreme noted by Scherer [1980] and others to the point of creating "patent thickets" that foster broader monopolies than anticipated by patent policy which in turn impede entry and the innovation that may accompany it.},
tags={patenting strategy, patent portfolio races},
filename={Cohen Nelson Walsh (2000) - Protecting Their Intellectual Assets.pdf}
}
@article{csardi2007modeling,
title={Modeling innovation by a kinetic description of the patent citation system},
author={Cs{\'a}rdi, G. and Strandburg, K.J. and Zal{\'a}nyi, L. and Tobochnik, J. and {\'E}rdi, P.},
journal={Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications},
volume={374},
number={2},
pages={783--793},
year={2007},
abstract={This paper reports results of a network theory approach to the study of the United States patent system. We model the patent citation network as a discrete time, discrete space stochastic dynamic system. From data on more than 2 million patents and their citations, we extract an attractiveness function, A(k, l), which determines the likelihood that a patent will be cited. A(k, l) is approximately separable into a product of a function Ak(k) and a function Al(l), where k is the number of citations already received (in-degree) and l is the age measured in patent number units. Al(l) displays a peak at low l and a long power law tail, suggesting that some patented technologies have very long-term effects. Ak(k) exhibits super-linear preferential attachment. The preferential attachment exponent has been increasing since 1991, suggesting that patent citations are increasingly concentrated on a relatively small number of patents. The overall average probability that a new patent will be cited by a given patent has increased slightly during the same period. We discuss some possible implications of our results for patent policy.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={General},
tags={Citation Networks},
filename={Csardi (2007) - Modeling Innovation By A Kinetic Description Of The Patent Citation System.pdf}
}
@article{fischer2011patent,
title={Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology-An Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent Acquisitions},
author={Fischer, T. and Henkel, J.},
journal={Available at SSRN 1523102},
year={2011},
abstract={Patent trolls appropriate profits from innovation solely by enforcing patents against infringers. They are often characterized as relying on low-quality patents, an assessment that, if correct, would imply that eradicating such patents would effectively terminate the troll business. In this paper, we shed light on this issue by empirically analyzing trolls’ patent acquisitions. We draw on a unique dataset of 565 patents acquired by known patent trolls between 1997 and 2007, which we compare to 1,130 patents acquired by practicing firms. Our findings regarding patent characteristics support recent theoretical propositions about the troll business model. Trolls focus on patents that have a broad scope and that lie in patent thickets. Surprisingly, and contrary to common belief, we find that troll patents are of significantly higher quality than those in the control group. This result implies that elevating minimum patent quality will not put an end to the patent troll business, and suggests that it is sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, we discuss the fact that trolls are peculiar players on markets for technology insofar as they are solely interested in the exclusion right, not in the underlying knowledge. We posit that transactions involving patent trolls may only be the tip of the iceberg of “patent-only” transactions, a conjecture with strong implications for the efficiency of markets for technologies. Managerial and policy implications are discussed.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Model},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The second patent characteristic patent trolls should favor is a high cost of substituting the underlying invention in products. This substitution cost increases with the difficulty of inventing around the patent, which in turn is high if the patent density and complexity of the relevant technology field is high. This means that many patents exist that have a high degree of overlap between them and with the patent under consideration, so that finding a gap for a non-patented substitutive technology is difficult.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={This means that many patents exist that have a high degree of overlap between them and with the patent under consideration, so that finding a gap for a non-patented substitutive technology is difficult. In other words, the focal patent is part of a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={patent trolls, patent quality, licensing, business model},
filename={Fischer Henkel (2011) - Patent Trolls On Markets For Technology.pdf}
}
@article{gallini2002economics,
title={The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent US Patent Reform},
author={Gallini, N.T.},
journal={Journal of Economic Perspectives},
pages={131--154},
year={2002},
publisher={JSTOR},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
tags={Patent Protection, Patent Proliferation, Effects on Disclosure, Effects on Innovation},
filename={Gallini (2002) - The Economics Of Patents Lessons From Recent Us Patent Reform.pdf}
}
@incollection{gallini2002intellectual,
title={Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?},
author={Gallini, N. and Scotchmer, S.},
booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2},
pages={51--78},
year={2002},
publisher={MIT Press},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
tags={prizes, fixed price contract, auction, },
filename={Gallini Scotchmer (2002) - Intellectual Property When Is It The Best Incentive System.pdf}
}
@article{geroski2005intellectual,
title={Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and Innovation: Is There a Problem?},
author={Geroski, P.A.},
journal={SCRIPT ed},
volume={2},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
tags={Incentives for Innovation, Sequential Innovation, Cummulative Innovation, Licensing},
filename={Geroski (2005) - Intellectual Property Rights Competition Policy And Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{gilbert1982preemptive,
title={Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly},
author={Gilbert, R.J. and Newbery, D.M.G.},
journal={The American Economic Review},
pages={514--526},
year={1982},
publisher={JSTOR},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Mathematical},
industry={General},
tags={Strategic Behavior, Incentives for Innovation},
filename={Gilbert Newbery (1982) - Preemptive Patenting And The Persistence Of Monopoly.pdf}
}
@article{huys2009legal,
title={Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing},
author={Huys, I. and Berthels, N. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.},
journal={Nature biotechnology},
volume={27},
number={10},
pages={903--909},
year={2009},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
abstract={A patent landscape analysis of 22 common genetic diagnostic tests shows substantially fewer claims on genes per se than initially suggested but raises questions of legal uncertainty as to the claims’ scope.},
discipline={Biology, Law},
research_type={Empirical study, Industry Statistics},
industry={Biology, Genetics},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={With respect to genes, 25% of the identified patents, filed by different applicants, claim a human gene, suggesting the possibility of the existence of a patent thicket. In contrast to this relatively high number of gene claims, only 3% of these gene claims can be classified as occupying a blocking position. Therefore, a hindering patent thicket cannot be demonstrated.},
thicket_def={def33},
thicket_def_extract={First, is a patent thicket, defined as many blocking patents from many different owners, emerging in the genetic diagnostic sector?},
tags={genetic diagnostic testing, patent proliferation, research sector},
filename={Huys (2009) - Legal Uncertainty In The Area Of Genetic Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
@article{joshi2011strategic,
title={When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industry},
author={Joshi, A.M. and Nerkar, A.},
journal={Strategic Management Journal},
volume={32},
number={11},
pages={1139--1160},
year={2011},
publisher={Wiley Online Library},
abstract={Research and development (R&D) consortia are specialized strategic alliances that shape the direction and scope of firm innovation activities. Little research exists on the performance conse- quences of participating in R&D consortia. We study the effect of patent pools, a unique form of R&D consortia, on firm performance in innovation. While prior research on alliances generally implies that patent pools enhance firm innovation, our study finds the opposite. Analyzing data on systemic innovation in the global optical disc industry, we find that patent pool formation substan- tially and significantly decreases both the quantity and quality of patents subsequently generated by licensors and licensees relative to the patenting activity of nonparticipants. Our empirical findings suggest that patent pools actually inhibit, rather than enhance, systemic innovation by participating firms.},
discipline={Econ, Management},
research_type={Econometric Model},
industry={General},
tags={Patent Pools},
filename={Joshi Nerkar (2011) - When Do Strategic Alliances Inhibit Innovation By Firms.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2007ten,
title={Ten things to do about patent holdup of standards (and one not to)},
author={Lemley, M.A.},
journal={BCL Rev.},
volume={48},
pages={149},
year={2007},
abstract={A central fact about the information technology sector is the multiplicity of patents that innovators must deal with. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of patents cover semiconductor, software, telecommunica- tions, and Internet inventions. Because of the nature of information technology, innovation often requires the combination of a number of different patents. Currently, various features of the patent system facili- tate holdup, particularly in the standard-setting context. These features include insufficient discounting in damages for patent infringement and the resultant inflated demands for royalties, the low standard of proof for willful infringement, which allows patentees to recover treble damages, and the threat of injunctive relief. Frequently, innovators make irreversible investments in their development of new technology, only to have those investments used against them as a bargaining chip by existing patent holders. This Article suggests five steps that standard-setting organizations may take to reduce the problem of patent holdup and five ways the law should change to deal with the problem.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Policy},
industry={ICT, Technology},
tags={RAND, Licensing, Patent Holdup, SSO},
filename={Lemley (2007) - Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards And One Not To.pdf}
}
@article{marco2008therole,
title = {The Role of Patent Rights in Mergers: Consolidation in Plant Biotechnology},
author = {Marco, Alan C. and Gordon C. Rausser},
journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics},
volume = {90},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 133-151},
abstract = {Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using firm-level patent data for firms in plant biotechnology, we develop a measure of patent enforceability. Duration models show that patent statistics are useful predictors of the timing of consolidation and that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of consolidation. Acquisitions in plant biotechnology may be motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies; some merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology, as exemplified by the case of Roundup Ready corn.},
year = {2008},
publisher = {Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association},
copyright = {Copyright © 2008 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association},
abstract={Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using firm-level patent data for firms in plant biotechnology, we develop a measure of patent enforceability. Duration models show that patent statistics are useful predictors of the timing of consolidation and that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of consolidation. Acquisitions in plant biotechnology may be motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies; some merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology, as exemplified by the case of Roundup Ready corn.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Mathematical},
industry={Agriculture, Biotechnology},
tags={Patent statistics},
filename={Marco Rausser (2008) - The Role Of Patent Rights In Mergers.pdf}
}
@article{murray2006when,
title = {When Ideas Are Not Free: The Impact of Patents on Scientific Research},
author = {Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott},
journal = {Innovation Policy and the Economy},
volume = {7},
number = {},
pages = {pp. 33-69},
abstract = {This chapter describes the impact of formal intellectual property rights on the production and diffusion of "dual knowledge"-ideas that are simultaneously of value as a scientific discovery and as a useful, inventive construct. We argue that a great deal of knowledge generated in academia, particularly in the life sciences, falls into this category (sometimes referred to as Pasteur's Quadrant). The production and diffusion of dual purpose knowledge challenges the premise of most science policy analysis, which is implicitly based on a clear separation between basic scientific knowledge and applied knowledge useful in the development of new technology. Instead, dual knowledge simultaneously makes both a basic and an applied contribution. We review qualitative and quantitative evidence relating to the policy challenges raised by the production and dissemination of dual knowledge, highlighting three broad findings. First, rather than facing a fundamental tradeoff between applied research and more fundamental scientific knowledge, research agencies can and do invest in dual purpose knowledge. Indeed, the dual purpose knowledge framework suggests a distinct rationale for public sector involvement in the funding and conduct of research: the social impact of a given piece of knowledge may be enhanced when knowledge is produced and disclosed in accordance with the norms of the scientific research community (particularly compared to secrecy). Second, we suggest that, within Pasteur's Quadrant, the increased use of formal IPR seems to be significantly shaping the structure, conduct and performance of both university and industry researchers. On the one hand, from the perspective of individual researchers, patenting does not seem to come at the expense of scientific publication, and both respond to the process of scientific discovery. There is some evidence, however, that patent grant may reduce the extent of use of knowledge: the citation rate to a scientific article describing a dual-purpose discovery experiences a modest decline after patent rights are granted over that knowledge. Finally, the impact of patents may be indirect; rather than directly impacting behavior through patent enforcement, scientific conduct may be affected through related mechanisms such as material transfer agreements. Not simply a legal document within a seamless web of cooperation, nor a bludgeon to stop scientific progress in its tracks, patents seem to be changing the "rules of the game" for scientific exchange, cooperation, and credit.},
year = {2006},
publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
copyright = {Copyright © 2006 The National Bureau of Economic Research},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Empirics},
industry={Academic Research, General},
tags={Licensing, scientific research productivity},
filename={Murray Stern (2006) - When Ideas Are Not Free The Impact Of Patents On Scientific Research.pdf}
}
@article{parchomovsky2005patent,
title = {Patent Portfolios},
author = {Gideon Parchomovsky and Wagner, R. Polk},
journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
volume = {154},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 1-77},
abstract = {This article develops a comprehensive theory of patent value, responding to growing empirical evidence that the traditional appropriability premise of patents is fundamentally incomplete in the modern innovation environment. We find that for patents, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: the true value of patents lies not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of related patents a patent portfolio.The patent portfolio theory thus explains what is known as "the patent paradox": in recent years patent intensity patents obtained per research and development dollar has risen dramatically even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished. We find the benefits of patent portfolios to be so significant as to suggest that firms9 patenting decisions are largely unrelated to the expected value of individual patents; because patent portfolios simultaneously increase both the scale and the diversity of available marketplace protections for innovations, firms will typically seek to obtain a large quantity of related patents, rather than evaluating their actual worth. The result?which we find widely recognized in commercial circles?is that the modem patenting environment exhibits (and requires) a high-volume, portfolio-based approach that is at odds with scholars' traditional assumptions. The implications of the portfolio theory of patents are important and wide spread. First, the explanatory power of the theory allows resolution not only of the patent paradox, but also of many of the otherwise puzzling observable patterns in the modern patenting environment, such as firm-size differences in patent intensity and litigation rates. Second, the patent portfolio theory neatly complements the prior theories that have sought to explain modern patent value, strengthening their relationship with the reality of patenting behavior, and confirming that the value of patents has expanded beyond traditionalist notions. Third, the patent portfolio theory offers a number of important predic tive insights into future trends in the patent system, allowing policymakers and scholars to frame their inquiry within a range of likely outcomes. In our analysis, the patent portfolio theory does not suggest a better, brighter future for the patent system, but does build a foundation for the important academic and policy-related work that springs from this initial treatment.},
year = {2005},
publisher = {The University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
copyright = {Copyright © 2005 The University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory, Discussion, Industry Statistics},
industry={General},
tags={Patent Portfolio theory, proliferation of patent thickets, patent paradox},
filename={Parchomovsky Wagner (2005) - Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
@article{pray2005innovation,
title={Innovation and dynamic efficiency in plant biotechnology: An introduction to the researchable issues},
author={Pray, C. and Oehmke, J.F. and Naseem, A.},
year={2005},
publisher={AgBioForum},
abstract={The agricultural biotechnology industry is characterized by heavy investment in research and development, dynamic technical change, and increasing concentration in both the output market and the ownership of intellectual properties that support ongoing innovation. This raises questions about the industry’s ability to continue to deliver path-breaking innovations. This paper lays out these questions, describes the relevant data (including the newly available agricultural biotechnology intellectual property database), and provides a conceptual framework for addressing the questions. The empirical discussion and conceptual framework in this paper constitute a structure upon which the remaining articles in this issue build to address the overall question of how best we can maintain socially desirable rates of innovation and dynamic efficiency in plant biotechnology.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Discussion},
industry={Biotech},
tags={Industry structure, innovation},
filename={Pray Oehmke Naseem (2005) - Innovation And Dynamic Efficiency In Plant Biotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{reichman2007harmonization,
jstor_articletype = {research-article},
title = {Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty},
author = {Reichman, Jerome H. and Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper},
journal = {Duke Law Journal},
jstor_issuetitle = {},
volume = {57},
number = {1},
jstor_formatteddate = {Oct., 2007},
pages = {pp. 85-130},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040588},
ISSN = {00127086},
abstract = {In this Article, we contend that the World Intellectual Property Organization's proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) is premature. Developing countries are struggling to adjust to the heightened standards of intellectual property protection required by the TRIPS Agreement of 1994. With TRIPS, at least, these countries obtained side payments (in the form of trade concessions) to offset the rising costs of knowledge products. A free-standing instrument, such as the SPLT, would shrink the remaining flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement with no side payments and no concessions to the catch-up strategies of developing countries at different stages of technological advancement. More controversially, we argue that a deep harmonization would boomerang against even its developed country promoters by creating more problems than it would solve. There is no vision of a properly functioning patent system for the developed world that commands even the appearance of a consensus. The evidence shows, instead, that the worldwide intellectual property system has entered a brave new scientific epoch, in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas about how best to treat a daunting array of new technologies. The proposals for reconciling the needs of different sectors, such as information technology and biotechnology, pose hard, unresolved issues at a time when the costs of litigation are rising at the expense of profits from innovation. These difficulties are compounded by the tendency of universities to push patenting up stream, generating new rights to core methodologies and research tools. As new approaches to new technologies emerge in different jurisdictions, there is a need to gather empirical evidence to determine which, if any, of these still experimental solutions are preferable over time. Our argument need not foreclose other less intrusive options and measures surveyed in the Article that can reduce the costs of delaying harmonization. However, the international community should not rush to freeze legal obligations regarding the protection of intellectual property. It should wait until economists and policymakers better understand the dynamics of innovation and the role that patent rights play in promoting progress and until there are mechanisms in place to keep international obligations responsive to developments in science, technology, and the organization of the creative community.},
language = {English},
year = {2007},
publisher = {Duke University School of Law},
copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Duke University School of Law},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Theory},
industry={General},
tags={TRIPS, SPLT, WIPO, International, Patent Law},
filename={Reichman Dreyfuss (2007) - Harmonization Without Consensus.pdf}
}
@article{sharrott2006intellectual,
title={Intellectual Property Developments in Biochip Nanotechology},
author={Sharrott, D. and Sayeed, H.A.},
journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.},
volume={3},
pages={20},
year={2006},
abstract={Microfluidics is the science of devices and processes dealing with fluid volumes on the nanoliter or picoliter scale. The most popular and commercially visible applications of this technology consist of DNA microarrays, or “biochips.” DNA microarrays are most useful for their fast, efficient processing of multiple DNA sequences of genes. In this article, Douglas Sharrott and Hassen Sayeed explain the various intellectual property (“IP”) issues relating to DNA microarrays and microfluidics applications. They also examine alternative methods of protecting valuable IP, such as trade secret and “mask work” protection under the copyright laws. Finally, Sharrott and Sayeed discuss a representative case that teaches valuable lessons to those in the microfluidics industry to help guide IP strategies.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Until recently, the most significant IP concern about biochips involved the patentability of expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”)—gene fragments for which no known functional utility exists. When the National Institutes of Health applied for the first EST patents in 1991, the possibility arose that such patents could overlap with and possibly invalidate later patents directed toward fully-sequenced, expressed genes.8 Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained from that gene.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained from that gene.},
tags={biochips, trade secrets},
filename={Sharrott Sayeed (2006) - Intellectual Property Developments In Biochip Nanotechology.pdf}
}
@article{turner2011patent,
title={Patent Thickets, Trolls and Unproductive Entrepreneurship},
author={Turner, J.},
journal={Trolls and Unproductive Entrepreneurship (October 1, 2011)},
year={2011},
abstract={I introduce and analyze an equilibrium model of invention, patenting and infringement under monopolistic competition. Profitable use of inventions requires adaptation to complementary technologies. With patents, a thicket of conflicting rights emerges and costly infringements occur. This taxes invention and lowers welfare. When an inventor may be a “troll”—patent without inventing—the rate of invention falls further. Intuitively, some trolls would invent if it were impossible to be a troll. More technology is patented with trolls, so the thicket grows and welfare falls. Being a troll is unprofitable unless a critical mass of inventions, made by other firms, exists.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
tags={patent, thicket, trolls, sequential innovation},
filename={Turner (2011) - Patent Thickets Trolls And Unproductive Entrepreneurship.pdf}
}
Additional entries
@article{anand2000structure,
title={The structure of licensing contracts},
author={Anand, Bharat N and Khanna, Tarun},
journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume={48},
number={1},
pages={103--135},
year={2000},
abstract={Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple 'facts' concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross-industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Anand Khanna (2000) - The Structure Of Licensing Contracts.pdf}
}
@article{green1995division,
title={On the division of profit in sequential innovation},
author={Green, Jerry R and Scotchmer, Suzanne},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
pages={20--33},
year={1995},
abstract={In markets with sequential innovation, inventors of derivative improvements might undermine the profit of initial innovators through competition. Profit erosion can be mitigated by broadening the first innovator's patent protection and/or by permitting cooperative agreements between initial innovators and later innovators. We investigate the policy that is most effective at ensuring the first innovator earns a large share of profit from the second-generation products it facilitates. In general, not all the profit can be transferred to the first innovator, and therefore patents should last longer when a sequence of innovations is undertaken by different firms rather than being concentrated in one firm.},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Green Scotchmer (1995) - On The Division Of Profit In Sequential Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope.pdf}
}
@article{Scotchmer2008standing,
title={Standing on the shoulders of giants},
author={Scotchmer},
journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume={5},
number={1}
pages={29-41},
year={1991},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Scotchmer (2008) - Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants.pdf}
}
@article{jaffe2000us,
title={The US patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process},
author={Jaffe, Adam B},
journal={Research policy},
volume={29},
number={4},
pages={531--557},
year={2000},
abstract={This paper surveys the major changes in patent policy and practice that have occured in the last two decades in the U.S., and reviews the existing analyses by the economists that attempt to measure the impacts these changes have had on the processes of technological change. It also reviews the broader theoretical and empirical literature that bears on the expected effects of changes in patent policy. Despite the significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few. Possible reasons for these limited results are discussed, and possible avenues for future research are suggested. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe (2000) - The Us Patent System In Transition.pdf}
}
@article{levin1987appropriating,
title={Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development},
author={Levin, Richard C and Klevorick, Alvin K and Nelson, Richard R and Winter, Sidney G and Gilbert, Richard and Griliches, Zvi},
journal={Brookings papers on economic activity},
volume={1987},
number={3},
pages={783--831},
year={1987},
abstract={},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Levin (1987) - Appropriating The Returns From Industrial Research And Development.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{kortum1998stronger,
title={Stronger protection or technological revolution: what is behind the recent surge in patenting?},
author={Kortum, Samuel and Lerner, Josh},
booktitle={Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy},
volume={48},
pages={247--304},
year={1998},
abstract={We investigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of U.S. patenting over the past decade. Conventional wisdom points to the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. We examine whether this institutional change, which has benefited patent holders, explains the burst in US. patenting. Using both international and domestic data on patent applications and awards, we conclude that the evidence is not favorable to the conventional view. Instead, it appears that the jump in patenting reflects an increase in U.S. innovation spurred by changes in the management of research.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Kortum Lerner (1998) - Stronger Protection Or Technological Revolution.pdf}
}
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999}
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf}
}
@article{hayslett1995antitrust,
title={1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibition of Antitrust Law},
author={Hayslett III, Thomas L},
journal={J. Intell. Prop. L.},
volume={3},
pages={375},
year={1995},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={HayslettIII (1995) - 1995 Antitrust Guidelines For The Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
@article{Oecd1994measurement,
title={Using patent data as science and technology indicators},
author={OECD},
journal={OECD},
year={1994},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={OECD (1994) - The Measurement Of Scientific And Technological Activities Using Patent Data As Science And Technology Indicators.pdf}
}
Additional Entries From Uncertain File
@article{bessen2007empirical,
title={An Empirical Look At Software Patents},
author={Bessen, James and Hunt, Robert M.},
journal={Economics & Management Strategy},
year={2007},
abstract={U.S. legal changes have made it easier to obtain patents on inventions that use software. Software patents have grown rapidly and now comprise 15 percent of all patents. They are acquired primarily by large manufacturing firms in industries known for strategic patenting; only 5 percent belong to software publishers. The very large increase in software patent propensity over time is not adequately explained by changes in R&D investments, employment of computer programmers, or productivity growth. The residual increase in patent propensity is consistent with a sizeable rise in the cost effectiveness of software patents during the 1990s. We find evidence that software patents substitute for R&D at the firm level; they are associated with lower R&D intensity. This result occurs primarily in industries known for strategic patenting and is difficult to reconcile with the traditional incentive theory of patents.},
discipline={Econ, Law},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Bessen Hunt (2007) - An Empirical Look At Software Patents.pdf}
}
@article{bessen2009sequential,
title={Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation},
author={Bessen, James and Maskin, Eric},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume={40},
number={4},
pages={611--635},
year={2009},
abstract={We argue that when innovation is (<sequential" (so that each successive invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and (icomplementary " (so that each potential innovator takes a different research line), patent protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation as in a static setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off without such protection. Furthermore, an inventor s prospective profit may actually be enhanced by competition and imitation. Our sequential model of},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
}
@book{bessen2008patent,
title={Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovators at risk},
author={Bessen, James and Meurer, Michael James},
year={2008},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Bessen Meurer (2008) - Patent Failure.pdf}
}
@article{blundell2002individual,
title={Individual effects and dynamics in count data models},
author={Blundell, Richard and Griffith, Rachel and Windmeijer, Frank},
journal={Journal of Econometrics},
volume={108},
number={1},
pages={113--131},
year={2002},
abstract={In this paper we examine the panel data estimation of dynamic models for count data that include correlated fixed effects and predetermined variables. Use of a linear feedback model is proposed. The standard Poisson conditional maximum likelihood estimator for non-dynamic models, which is shown to be the same as the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator in a model with individual specific constants, is consistent when regressors are predetermined. A quasi-differenced GMM estimator is consistent for the parameters in the dynamic model, but when series are highly persistent, there is a problem of weak instrument bias. As estimator is proposed that utilizes pre-sample information of the dependent count variable, which is shown in Monte Carlo simulations to possess desirable small sample properties. The model and estimators are applied to data on US patents and R&D expenditures.},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Empirical, Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Blundell Griffith Windmeijer (2002) - Individual Effects And Dynamics In Count Data Models.pdf}
}
@techreport{gans2000does,
title={When does start-up innovation spur the gale of creative destruction?},
author={Gans, Joshua S and Hsu, David H and Stern, Scott},
year={2000},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={High-tech},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Gans Hsu Stern (2000) - When Does Start Up Innovation Spur The Gale Of Creative Destruction.pdf}
}
@article{grindley1997managing,
title={Managing intellectual capital: licensing and cross-licensing in semiconductors and electronics},
author={Grindley, Peter C and Teece, David J},
year={1997},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Grindley Teece (1997) - Licensing And Cross Licensing In Semiconductors And Electronics.pdf}
}
@article{hall2005exploring,
title={Exploring the patent explosion},
author={Hall, Bronwyn},
journal={Essays in Honor of Edwin Mansfield},
pages={195--208},
year={2005},
abstract={This paper looks more closely at the sources of patent growth in the United States since 1984. It confirms that the increase is largely due to US patenters, with an earlier surge in Asia, and some increase in Europe. Growth has taken place in all technologies, but not in all industries, being concentrated in the electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries. It then examines whether these patents are valued by the market. We know from survey evidence that patents in these industries are not usually considered important for appropriability, but are sometimes considered necessary to secure financing for entering the industry. I compare the market value of patents held by entrant firms to those held by incumbents (controlling for R&D). Using data on publicly traded firms 1980-1989, I find that in industries based on electrical and mechanical technologies the market value of entrants’ patents is positive in the post-1984 period (after the patenting surge), but not before, when patents were relatively unimportant in these industries. Also, the value of patent rights in complex product industries (where each product relies on many patents held by a number of other firms) is much higher for entrants than incumbents in the post-1984 period. For discrete product industries (where each product relies on only a few patents, and where the importance of patents for appropriability has traditionally been higher), there is no difference between incumbents and entrants.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Hall (2005) - Exploring The Patent Explosion.pdf}
}
@techreport{hall2001nber,
title={The NBER patent citation data file: Lessons, insights and methodological tools},
author={Hall, Bronwyn H and Jaffe, Adam B and Trajtenberg, Manuel},
year={2001},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
abstract={This paper describes the database on U.S. patents that we have developed over the past decade, with the goal of making it widely accessible for research. We present main trends in U. S. patenting over the last 30 years, including a variety of original measures constructed with citation data, such as backward and forward citation lags, indices of originality and generality, self-citations, etc. Many of these measures exhibit interesting differences across the six main technological categories that we have developed (comprising Computers and Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronics, Chemical, Mechanical and Others), differences that call for further research. To stimulate such research, the entire database about 3 million patents and 16 million citations is now available on the NBER website. We discuss key issues that arise in the use of patent citations data, and suggest ways of addressing them. In particular, significant changes over time in the rate of patenting and in the number of citations made, as well as the inevitable truncation of the data, make it very hard to use the raw number of citations received by different patents directly in a meaningful way. To remedy this problem we suggest two alternative approaches: the fixed-effects approach involves scaling citations by the average citation count for a group of patents to which the patent of interest belongs; the quasi-structural approach attempts to distinguish the multiple effects on citation rates via econometric estimation.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Hall Jaffe Trajtenberg (2001) - The Nber Patent Citation Data File.pdf}
}
@article{harhoff2004determinants,
title={Determinants of opposition against EPO patent grants—the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals},
author={Harhoff, Dietmar and Reitzig, Markus},
journal={International journal of industrial organization},
volume={22},
number={4},
pages={443--480},
year={2004},
abstract={We use a newly developed data set covering all biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents granted by the European Patent Office. We analyze the determinants of opposition which can be considered an early form of litigation. In our sample, the validity of 8.6 percent of the patents are attacked in the opposition proceeding. Using citation and patent family indicators, we show that valuable patents are more likely to be attacked, and that opposition is particularly likely to occur in areas with strong cumulative patent numbers and with greater uncertainty.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Harhoff Reitzig (2004) - Determinants Of Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants.pdf}
}
@book{jaffe2004innovation,
title={Innovation and its discontents: How our broken patent system is endangering innovation and progress, and what to do about it},
author={Jaffe, Adam B and Lerner, Josh},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe Lerner (2004) - Innovation And Its Discontents.pdf}
}
@article{lanjouw2001tilting,
title={Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions*},
author={Lanjouw, Jean O and Lerner, Josh},
journal={Journal of Law and Economics},
volume={44},
number={2},
pages={573--603},
year={2001},
abstract={This paper examines the economic role of preliminary injunctions in legal disputes. We present a model in which differences in financing costs drive the use of preliminary injunction and explore the implications of this legal remedy for ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives. Controlling for the nature of the dispute, we examine the relationships between the financial status of litigating parties and whether a preliminary injunction is requested. The empirical analysis uses detailed data compiled for a sample of 252 patent suits and reveals patterns generally consistent with those suggested by the model.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lanjouw Lerner (2001) - Tilting The Table The Use Of Preliminary Injunctions.pdf}
}
@article{lanjouw2001characteristics,
title={Characteristics of patent litigation: a window on competition},
author={Lanjouw, Jean O and Schankerman, Mark},
journal={RAND journal of economics},
pages={129--151},
year={2001},
abstract={The cost of engaging in litigation over intellectual property assets diminishes their value as an incentive to invest in research. The frequency of court cases ref ectsfirms' strategies for appropriating innovation rents. We examine the characteristics of litigated patents and their owners by combining, for the first time, information about patent case filings from the U.S. district courts with detailed data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. By comparing filed cases to a control group, we show that there is substantial variation across patents in their exposure to litigation risk. We use this empirical evidence to examine hypotheses about the determinants of patent suits.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lanjouw Schankerman (2001) - Characteristics Of Patent Litigation A Window On Competition.pdf}
}
@article{lee1980market,
title={Market structure and innovation: a reformulation},
author={Lee, Tom and Wilde, Louis L},
journal={The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
pages={429--436},
year={1980},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={}, ,
filename={Lee Wilde (1980) - Market Structure And Innovation A Reformulation.pdf}
}
@article{lerner1995patenting,
title={Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors},
author={Lerner, Josh},
journal={JL \& Econ.},
volume={38},
pages={463},
year={1995},
abstract={This article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs. I show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards, particularly those of firms with low litigation costs. This pattern is consistent with the literature of costly litigation, which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation. These results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lerner (1995) - Patenting In The Shadow Of Competitors.pdf}
}
@article{meyer2000patent,
title={Patent Citations in a Novel Field of Technology—What Can They Tell about Interactions between Emerging Communities of Science and Technology?},
author={Meyer, Martin},
journal={Scientometrics},
volume={48},
number={2},
pages={151--178},
year={2000},
abstract={This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of patent citation analysis in general and its application to novel fields of science and technology in particular. It introduces into the subject-matter by discussing an empirical problem, the relationship of nano-publications and nano-patents as representations of nano-science and nano-technology. Drawing on a variety of sources, different interpretations of patent citations are presented. Then, the nature of patent citations is further investigated by comparing them to citations in the scientific literature. After characterizing the citation linkage as indicators of reciprocal relationships between science and technology, patent citations in nano-science and technology are analyzed in terms of interfield and organizational knowledge-flows.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Meyer (2000) - Patent Citations In A Novel Field Of Technology.pdf}
}
@article{milgrom1990rationalizability,
title={Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities},
author={Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John},
journal={Econometrica},
volume={58},
number={6},
pages={1255--1277},
year={1990}
abstract={We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Milgrom Roberts (1990) - Rationalizability Learning And Equilibrium In Games With Strategic Complementarities.pdf}
}
@article{reinganum1989timing,
title={The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion},
author={Reinganum, Jennifer F},
journal={Handbook of industrial organization},
volume={1},
pages={849--908},
year={1989},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Reinganum (1989) - The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion.pdf}
}
@book{scotchmer2004innovation,
title={Innovation and incentives},
author={Scotchmer, Suzanne},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
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filename={Scotchmer (2004) - Innovation And Incentives.pdf}
}
@article{teece1986profiting,
title={Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy},
author={Teece, David J},
journal={Research policy},
volume={15},
number={6},
pages={285--305},
year={1986},
abstract={},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
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filename={Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation}
}
Additional Entries Added During the Write-up
@article{buchanan2000symmetric,
title={Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons},
author={Buchanan, James M and Yoon, Yong J},
journal={JL \& Econ.},
volume={43},
pages={1},
year={2000},
publisher={HeinOnline},
abstract={},
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research_type={},
industry={},
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filename={Buchanan Yoon (2000) - Symmetric Tragedies.pdf}
}
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
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filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope.pdf}
}
