Changes

  ECON 224 - The Economics of Institutions is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Pablo Spiller ([mailto:spiller@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/spiller_pablo.aspx website]) in the Spring of 2009.   

  The course readings([http://www.edegan.com/repository/ECON224.zip zip file]), by lecture, were listed as follows:  

 *North, Douglass (1991). "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver (2000), "New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal of Economic Literature[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(2000)%20-%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver (1998), "The Institutions of Governance", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1998)%20-%20The%20Institutions%20of%20Governance.pdf pdf] *Palay, Thomas M. (1985), "Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements". Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 1 (1): 155-175[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Palay%20(1985)%20-%20Avoiding%20Regulatory%20Constraints.pdf pdf] *Goldberg, Victor, P. (1990), "Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, March, 216-222.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1990)%20-%20Aversion%20to%20Risk%20Aversion%20in%20the%20New%20Institutional%20Economics.pdf pdf]   

 *Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver, (1983), "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf] *Telser, Lester (1981), "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, 27-44. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Telser%20(1981)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Self-Enforcing%20Agreements.pdf pdf] *Hodgson, G.M. (2004), "Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy," Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2), April, 401-418. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hodgson%20(2004)%20-%20Opportunism%20is%20not%20the%20only%20reason%20why%20firms%20exist.pdf pdf] *Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler (1981), "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4. pp. 615-641. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Leffler%20(1981)%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20Market%20Forces%20in%20Assuring%20Contractual%20Performance.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver (1988), "The Logic of Economic Organization", in Conference Papers to Celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the "Nature of the Firm", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1. pp. 65-93 (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Logic%20of%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]   

 *Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf] *Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] *Gibbons, Robert (1998), "Incentives in Organizations", (in Symposium: The Firm and Its Boundaries) The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4. pp. 115-132 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf] *Gibbons, Robert (2004), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?" (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] *Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System", The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. pp. 972-991[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Firm%20as%20an%20Incentive%20System.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf] *Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983), "Agency Problems and Residual Claims", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 327-349. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fama%20Jensen%20(1983)%20-%20Agency%20Problems%20and%20Residual%20Claims.pdf pdf] *Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983), "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 301-325. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fama%20Jensen%20(1983)%20-%20Separation%20of%20Ownership%20and%20Control.pdf pdf] *Hansmann H. and R. Kraakman (1999), "The Essential Role of Organizational Law" (April 29). Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 126. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hansmann%20Kraakman%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Essential%20Role%20of%20Organizational%20Law.pdf pdf] *Hansmann H. (1988), "Ownership of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Fall , 267-304. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hansmann%20(1988)%20-%20Ownership%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] *Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1998), "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited", in Symposium: The Firm and Its Boundaries, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4. pp. 73-94. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1998)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20of%20the%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]   

 *Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf] *Levin Jonathan and Steve Tadelis, (xxxx) "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from US Cities", mimeo.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levin%20Tadelis%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20Government%20Services.pdf pdf] *Holmstrom, Bengt (1999), "The firm as a subeconomy", J. Law Econ. Organ., 15: 74 - 102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20firm%20as%20a%20subeconomy.pdf pdf] *Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001), "Incentives vs. Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 387-407. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20vs%20Transaction%20Costs.pdf pdf] *Whinston (2003), "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf] (Additional Reading Added Later) 

 *Masten, Scott E., James W. Meehan, Jr., Edward A. Snyder (1991), "The Costs of Organization", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring), pp. 1-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Masten%20Meehan%20Snyder%20(1991)%20-%20The%20Costs%20of%20Organization.pdf pdf] *Bajari, Patrick, Robert McMillan, and Steven Tadelis (2004), "Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis", mimeo. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20McMillan%20Tadelis%20(2004)%20-%20Auctions%20versus%20Negotiations%20in%20Procurement.pdf pdf] *Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf] *Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]   

 *Leffler, Keith B., Randal R. Rucker, Ian A. Munn (2000), "Transaction costs and the collection of information: presale measurement on private timber sales", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, (April), v16 i1, pp. 166-188. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Leffler%20Rucker%20Munn%20(2000)%20-%20Transaction%20costs%20and%20the%20collection%20of%20information.pdf pdf] *Leffler, Keith B., and Randal R. Rucker (1991) "Transaction Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts", Journal of Political Economy, 99(5), 1060-1087. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Leffler%20Rucker%20(1991)%20-%20Transaction%20Costs%20and%20the%20Efficient%20Organization%20of%20Production.pdf pdf] *Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck (1993), "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1. pp. 78-100. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Allen%20Lueck%20(1993)%20-%20Transaction%20Costs%20and%20the%20Design%20of%20Cropshare%20Contracts.pdf pdf] *Nickerson, Jackson, and Brian Silverman (2003), "Why Firms Want to Organize Efficiently and What Keeps Them from Doing So: Inappropriate Governance, Performance, and Adaptation in a Deregulated Industry", Administration Science Quarterly, vol 48, no.3, pp. 433-465. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nickerson%20Silverman%20(2003)%20-%20Why%20Firms%20Want%20to%20Organize%20Efficiently%20and%20What%20Keeps%20Them%20from%20Doing%20So.pdf pdf] *Hamilton, Barton and Jackson Nickerson (2003), "Correcting for Endogeneity in Strategic Management Research", Strategic Organization 1, 1, pp. 53-80.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hamilton%20Nickerson%20(2003)%20-%20Correcting%20for%20Endogeneity%20in%20Strategic%20Management%20Research.pdf pdf] *Nickerson, Jackson and Brian Silverman (2003), "Why Aren’t Aren’t All Truck Drivers Owner-Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate For-Hire Trucking", Journal of Economics, Management, and Strategy 91-118. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nickerson%20Silverman%20(2003)%20-%20Why%20Arent%20All%20Truck%20Drivers%20Owner%20Operators.pdf pdf] *Freeman, John, Jackson Nickerson and Brian Silverman (1997), "Profitability, Transactional Alignment, and Organizational Mortality in the U.S. Trucking Industry", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp. 31-52. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Freeman%20Nickerson%20Silverman%20(1997)%20-%20Profitability%20Transactional%20Alignment%20and%20Organizational%20Mortality.pdf pdf]   

 *Garicano, Luis and Thomas Hubbard (2007), "Managerial Leverage is Limited by the Extent of the Market: Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Lawyers Human Capital", Journal of Law & Economics, pp:1-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20Hubbard%20(2007)%20-%20Managerial%20Leverage%20is%20Limited%20by%20the%20Extent%20of%20the%20Market.pdf pdf] *Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2004), "Outsourcing in a Knowledge Economy" (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Antras%20Garicano%20RossiHansberg%20(2006)%20-%20Outsourcing%20in%20a%20Knowledge%20Economy.pdf pdf] *Garicano, Luis and Tano Santos (2004), "Referrals", AERthe American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp:499-525. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20Santos%20(2004)%20-%20Referrals.pdf pdf] *Garicano, Luis (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]   

 *Rindfleisch, Aric, and Jan B. Heide (1997), "Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications," Journal of Marketing, 61 (October), pp. 30-54.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Rindfleisch%20Heide%20(1997)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Analysis.pdf pdf] *Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20Shaw%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20Franchise%20Contracting.pdf pdf] *Bhattacharyya, Sugato and Francine Lafontaine (1995), "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts", in Part II: Agency Relationships, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4, Symposium on the Economics of Organization. pp. 761-781. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bhattacharyya%20Lafontaine%20(1995)%20-%20Double%20Sided%20Moral%20Hazard%20and%20the%20Nature%20of%20Share%20Contracts.pdf pdf] *Lafontaine, Francine (1993), "Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 256-289. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20(1993)%20-%20Contractual%20Arrangements%20as%20Signaling%20Devices.pdf pdf] *Lafontaine, Francine (1992), "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 263-283.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lafontaine%20(1992)%20-%20Agency%20Theory%20and%20Franchising.pdf pdf]   

 *Bengt Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] *Marianne Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan (2000), "Agents with and without Principals", The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May), pp. 203-208.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bertrand%20Mullainathan%20(2000)%20-%20Agents%20with%20and%20without%20Principals.pdf pdf] *Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan (xxxx2001), "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck: The Ones Without Principals Are", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 3, pp. 901-932. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bertrand%20Mullainathan%20(2001)%20-%20Are%20CEOs%20Rewarded%20for%20Luck.pdf pdf] *Anderson, Erin (1988), "Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces," Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20(1988)%20-%20Strategic%20Implications%20of%20Darwinian%20Economics%20for%20Selling%20Efficiency.pdf pdf] *Erin Anderson, Erin and David C. Schmittlein (1984), "Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Autumn), pp. 385-395. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Anderson%20Schmittlein%20(1984)%20-%20Integration%20of%20the%20Sales%20Force.pdf pdf] *Ichniowski, Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw, Giovanna Prennushi (1997), "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines", The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Jun.), pp. 291-313. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ichniowski%20Shaw%20Prennushi%20(1997)%20-%20The%20Effects%20of%20Human%20Resource%20Management%20Practices%20on%20Productivity.pdf pdf]   

 *Prendergast C. and R.H. Topel (1996), "Favoritism in Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 104, pp. 958-978[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20Topel%20(1996)%20-%20Favoritism%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf] *Holmstrom, B (1999), "The Firm as a Subeconomy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, pp. 74-102. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20firm%20as%20a%20subeconomy.pdf pdf] *Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf] *Holmstrom B. , Bengt and P. Paul Milgrom (1991). , "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, and & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(Optional Reading1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] *Gibbons, R. (1998), "Incentives in Organizations.", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23).[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(1998)%20-%20Incentives%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf] *Baker. G. (1992), "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement", Journal of Political Economy, 100, pp. 598-614. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20(1992)%20-%20Incentive%20Contracts%20and%20Performance%20Measurement.pdf pdf] 

 *Prendergast. C. (1999), "The Provision of Incentives in Firms.", Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Provision%20of%20Incentives%20in%20Firms.pdf pdf] 

 *Shelanski, H.A. (2004), "Transaction-level Determinants of Transfer-Pricing Policy: Evidence from the High-Technology Sector, Industrial and Corporate Change, 13, pp. 953-966. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shelanski%20(2004)%20-%20Transaction%20level%20Determinants%20of%20Transfer-Pricing%20Policy.pdf pdf] *Dal Bó, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bó, and Rafael di Tella (2006), "Plata o Plomo? Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence", American Political Science Review, Vol 100, No. 1 Feb., pp. 41-53.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DalBo%20DalBo%20diTella%20(2006)%20-%20Plata%20o%20Plomo%20Bribe%20and%20Punishment%20in%20a%20Theory%20of%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]   

 *Spiller, Pablo (1990), "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf] *Prendergast, Canice (2003), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf] *Dixit, Avinash (2002), "Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review", The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Autumn), pp. 696-727. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20(2002)%20-%20Incentives%20and%20Organizations%20in%20the%20Public%20Sector.pdf pdf] *McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]   

 *Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf] *Goldberg (1976), "Regulation and Administered Contracts", Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, pp. 426-448.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1976)%20-%20Regulation%20and%20Administered%20Contracts.pdf pdf] *Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf] *Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf] *Troesken, W. (1997), "The sources of public ownership: Historical evidence from the gas industry", Journal of Law Economics & Organization, April, Vol. 13, pp. 1-25. (Optional Reading)[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Troesken%20(1997)%20-%20The%20sources%20of%20public%20ownership.pdf pdf]   

 *Weingast and Marshall (1988), "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf] *Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf] *McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf] *De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), "An informational perspective on administrative procedures", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]   

 *Williamson, Oliver E. Williamson (1993), "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36, No. 1, Part 2, John M. Olin Centennial Conference in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago, (Apr.), pp. 453-486. *Greif, Avner (1993), "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition", American Economic Review, 83 (3), 525-548.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Greif%20(1993)%20-%20Contract%20Enforceability%20and%20Economic%20Institutions%20in%20Early%20Trade.pdf pdf]