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→ECON224 Readings
1.) '''Institutions'''
*North, Douglass, (1991). "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives*Williamson, Oliver, (2000), "New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal of Economic Literature*Williamson, Oliver, (1998), "The Institutions of Governance", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings
*Palay, Thomas M. (1985), "Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements". Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 1 (1): 155-175
*Goldberg, Victor, P. (1990). , "Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, March, 216-222.
2.) '''Thinking Institutionally: The Problem of Commitment'''
*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, (1978). , "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326*Williamson, Oliver, (1983). , "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540*Williamson, Oliver, (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 *Telser, Lester, (1981). , "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, 27-44. (Optional Reading)*Hodgson, G.M. (2004). , "Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy," Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2), April, 401-418. (Optional Reading)*Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, (1981). , "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4. pp. 615-641. (Optional Reading)*Williamson, Oliver, (1988). , "The Logic of Economic Organization", in Conference Papers to Celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the "Nature of the Firm", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1. pp. 65-93 (Optional Reading)
3.) '''The Theory of the Firm'''
*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz, (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795
*Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica.
*Gibbons, Robert (1998), "Incentives in Organizations", (in Symposium: The Firm and Its Boundaries) The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4. pp. 115-132
*Gibbons, Robert (2004), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?" (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34.
*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, (1994) , "The Firm as an Incentive System", The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. pp. 972-991*Williamson, Oliver, (1979). , "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261.*Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen, (1983), "Agency Problems and Residual Claims", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 327-349. (Optional Reading)*Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen, (1983), "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 301-325. (Optional Reading)
*Hansmann H. and R. Kraakman (1999), "The Essential Role of Organizational Law" (April 29). Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 126. (Optional Reading)
*Hansmann H. (1988), "Ownership of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Fall , 267-304. (Optional Reading)
