Heller Eisenberg (1998) - Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research

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Article
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Has article title Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research
Has author Heller Eisenberg
Has year 1998
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Reference

  • Heller, M.A. and Eisenberg, R.S. (1998), "Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research", Science, Vol.280, No.5364, pp.698--701
@article{heller1998can,
  title={Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research},
  author={Heller, M.A. and Eisenberg, R.S.},
  journal={Science},
  volume={280},
  number={5364},
  pages={698--701},
  year={1998},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={Biomedical},
  thicket_stance={},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={},
  filename={Heller Eisenberg (1998) - Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research.pdf}
}

File(s)

Abstract

The 'tragedy of the commons' metaphor helps explain why people overuse shared resources. However, the recent proliferation of intellectual property rights in biomedical research suggests a different tragedy, an “anticommons” in which people underuse scarce resources because too many owners can block each other. Privatization of biomedical research must be more carefully deployed to sustain both upstream research and downstream product development. Otherwise, more intellectual property rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health.

Review

Definition of patent thicket

"...a resource is prone to underuse in a 'tragedy of the anticommons' when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use."

Discussion

The article considers the issue of anti-commons in U.S. Biomedical Research.

  • Typical solutions to anticommons in the biomedical field, such as patent pools, can be derailed by high transaction costs, heterogeneous interests and cognitive biases.
"Current examples in biomedical research demonstrate two mechanisms by which a government might inadvertently create an anticommons: either by creating too many concurrent fragments of intellectual property rights in potential future products or by permitting too many upstream patent owners to stack licenses on top of the future discoveries of downstream users."

Social Welfare Consequences

  • Increased patent rights can reduce innovation by creating patent thickets.
"Unable to procure a complete set of licenses, firms choose between diverting resources to less promising projects with fewer licensing obstacles or proceeding to animal and then clinical testing on the basis of incomplete information."
"…more upstream rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health."

Policy Advocated in Paper

"Privatization must be more carefully deployed if it is to serve the public goals of biomedical research. Policy-makers should seek to ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to minimize restrictive licensing practices that interfere with downstream product development."
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