PTLR Down Group Processed BibTeX
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The Processed Down Group BibTeX Records
@article{balasubramanian2011what,
Title={What Happens When Firms Patent? New Evidence From U.S. Economic Census Data},
author={Balasubramanian, Natarajan and Sivadasan, Jagadeesh},
journal={The Review of Economics and Statistics},
volume={93},
number={1},
pages={pp. 126-146},
abstract={We build a new concordance between the NBER Patent Data and U.S. Census microdata and use it to examine what happens when firms patent. We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze firsttime patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application. Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.},
year={2011},
publisher={The MIT Press},
copyright={Copyright © 2011 The MIT Press},
abstract={We build a new concordance between the NBER Patent Data and U.S. Census microdata and use it to examine what happens when firms patent. We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze firsttime patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application. Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={econometric},
industry={Manufacturing},
tags={Econometric data, manufacturing companies are better off when they patent vs. no patent},
filename={Balasubramanian Sivadasan (2011) - What Happens When Firms Patent.pdf}
}
@article{bargill2003thevalue,
title = {The Value of Giving Away Secrets},
author = {Bar-Gill, Oren and Gideon Parchomovsky},
journal = {Virginia Law Review},
volume = {89},
number = {8},
abstract = {},
language = {English},
year = {2003},
publisher = {Virginia Law Review},
copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Virginia Law Review},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
tags={Theory proving that inclusion and unprotected publication is the optimal strategy for all firms. Cumulative innovation is the result},
filename={BarGill Parchomovsky (2003) - The Value Of Giving Away Secrets.pdf}
}
@article{bessen2008value,
title={The Value of US Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics},
author={Bessen, J.},
journal={Research Policy},
volume={37},
number={5},
pages={932--945},
year={2008},
abstract={This paper uses renewal data to estimate the value of U.S. patents, controlling for patent and owner characteristics. Estimates of U.S. patent value are substantially larger than estimates for European patents, however, the ratio of patent value to R&D is only about 2%. Patents issued to small patentees are much less valuable than those issued to large corporations, perhaps reflecting imperfect markets for technology. Litigated patents are more valuable, as are highly cited patents. However, patent citations explain little variance in value. These estimates of patent value correspond to estimates of the contribution of patent rents to firm market value.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={General, Manufacturing},
tags={Patent Value, Firm Value, Rents},
filename={Bessen (2008) - The Value Of Us Patents By Owner And Patent Characteristics.pdf}
}
@article{blind2009influence,
title={The Influence of Strategic Patenting on Companies’ Patent Portfolios},
author={Blind, K. and Cremers, K. and Mueller, E.},
journal={Research Policy},
volume={38},
number={2},
pages={428--436},
year={2009},
publisher={Elsevier},
abstract={This paper analyses whether strategic motives for patenting influence the characteristics of companies’ patent portfolios. We use the number of citations and oppositions to represent these characteristics. The analysis is based on survey data from German companies, which are combined with EPO data covering applications from 1991 to 2000. We find clear evidence that the companies’ patenting strategies are related to the characteristics of their patent portfolios. First, companies using patents in the traditional way to protect their technological knowledge base receive a higher number of forward citations for their patents. Second, the motive of offensive – but not of defensive – blocking is related to a higher incidence of oppositions, whereas companies using patents as bartering chips in collaborations receive fewer citations and fewer oppositions to their patents.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Regression},
industry={German, general},
tags={strategic motives in patenting, effects on patent portfolios, offensive and defensive lead to different results},
filename={Blind Cremers Mueller (2009) - The Influence Of Strategic Patenting On Companies Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
@article{brenner2009optimal,
title={Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools},
author={Brenner, S.},
journal={Economic Theory},
volume={40},
number={3},
pages={373--388},
year={2009},
publisher={Springer},
abstract={Patent pools in the framework of Lerner and Tirole (2004) may enhance or reduce social welfare. The purpose of this paper is to devise a pool formation mechanism which prevents welfare decreasing pool equilibria to emerge, and which encourages welfare enhancing pool formation. In order to destabi- lize welfare decreasing pools, compulsory individual licensing (CIL) has been suggested. We show that in general, CIL is not an efficient antitrust tool. Welfare decreasing incomplete pools are weakly or even strongly stable to individual licensing. However, CIL under exclusive pool membership avoids stability problems of welfare enhancing pools, while it creates instability of welfare decreasing pools.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Model},
industry={General, ICT},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent pools have been proposed to solve this hold-up problem (Shapiro, 2001).},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Patent pools have been proposed to solve this hold-up problem (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={complementary patents, patent pools, },
filename={Brenner (2009) - Optimal Formation Rules For Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@article{carnabuci2009knowledge,
title = {Knowledge Specialization, Knowledge Brokerage and the Uneven Growth of Technology Domains},
author = {Carnabuci, Gianluca and Bruggeman, Jeroen},
journal = {Social Forces},
volume = {88},
number = {2},
pages = {pp. 607-641},
abstract = {Why do certain domains of knowledge grow fast while others grow slowly or stagnate? Two distinct theoretical arguments hold that knowledge growth is enhanced by knowledge specialization and knowledge brokerage. Based on the notion of recombinant knowledge growth, we show that specialization and brokerage are opposing modes of knowledge generation, the difference between them lying in the extent to which homogeneous vs. heterogeneous input ideas get creatively recombined. Accordingly, we investigate how both modes of knowledge generation can enhance the growth of technology domains. To address this question, we develop an argument that reconciles both specialization and brokerage into a dynamic explanation. Our contention is that specializing in an increasingly homogeneous set of input ideas is both more efficient and less risky than brokering knowledge. Nevertheless, specializing implies progressively exhausting available recombinant possibilities, while brokerage creates new ones. Hence, technology domains tend to grow faster when they specialize, but the more specialized they become, the more they need knowledge brokerage to grow. We cast out our argument into five hypotheses that predict how growth rates vary across technology domains.},
year = {2009},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical, Fixed Effects Regression},
industry={ICT},
tags={knowledge specialization, specialization enhances knowledge growth at a declining rate, sequential innovation},
filename={Carnabuci Bruggeman (2009) - Knowledge Specialization Knowledge Brokerage.pdf}
}
@article{clark2008fragmented,
title = {Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D},
author = {Clark, Derek J. and Konrad, Kai A.},
journal = {Management Science},
volume = {54},
number = {5},
pages = {pp. 969-981},
abstract = {Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.},
year = {2008},
publisher = {INFORMS},
copyright = {Copyright © 2008 INFORMS},
abstract={Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms’ willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Model},
industry={General},
tags={Complementary Patents, Cummulative Innovation},
filename={Clark Konrad (2008) - Fragmented Property Rights And Incentives For R And D.pdf}
}
@article{csardi2007modeling,
title={Modeling innovation by a kinetic description of the patent citation system},
author={Cs{\'a}rdi, G. and Strandburg, K.J. and Zal{\'a}nyi, L. and Tobochnik, J. and {\'E}rdi, P.},
journal={Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications},
volume={374},
number={2},
pages={783--793},
year={2007},
abstract={This paper reports results of a network theory approach to the study of the United States patent system. We model the patent citation network as a discrete time, discrete space stochastic dynamic system. From data on more than 2 million patents and their citations, we extract an attractiveness function, A(k, l), which determines the likelihood that a patent will be cited. A(k, l) is approximately separable into a product of a function Ak(k) and a function Al(l), where k is the number of citations already received (in-degree) and l is the age measured in patent number units. Al(l) displays a peak at low l and a long power law tail, suggesting that some patented technologies have very long-term effects. Ak(k) exhibits super-linear preferential attachment. The preferential attachment exponent has been increasing since 1991, suggesting that patent citations are increasingly concentrated on a relatively small number of patents. The overall average probability that a new patent will be cited by a given patent has increased slightly during the same period. We discuss some possible implications of our results for patent policy.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={General},
tags={Citation Networks},
filename={Csardi (2007) - Modeling Innovation By A Kinetic Description Of The Patent Citation System.pdf}
}
@article{gallini2002economics,
title={The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent US Patent Reform},
author={Gallini, N.T.},
journal={Journal of Economic Perspectives},
pages={131--154},
year={2002},
publisher={JSTOR},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
tags={Patent Protection, Patent Proliferation, Effects on Disclosure, Effects on Innovation},
filename={Gallini (2002) - The Economics Of Patents Lessons From Recent Us Patent Reform.pdf}
}
@incollection{gallini2002intellectual,
title={Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?},
author={Gallini, N. and Scotchmer, S.},
booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2},
pages={51--78},
year={2002},
publisher={MIT Press},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
tags={prizes, fixed price contract, auction, },
filename={Gallini Scotchmer (2002) - Intellectual Property When Is It The Best Incentive System.pdf}
}
@article{geroski2005intellectual,
title={Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and Innovation: Is There a Problem?},
author={Geroski, P.A.},
journal={SCRIPT ed},
volume={2},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
tags={Incentives for Innovation, Sequential Innovation, Cummulative Innovation, Licensing},
filename={Geroski (2005) - Intellectual Property Rights Competition Policy And Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{gilbert1982preemptive,
title={Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly},
author={Gilbert, R.J. and Newbery, D.M.G.},
journal={The American Economic Review},
pages={514--526},
year={1982},
publisher={JSTOR},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Mathematical},
industry={General},
tags={Strategic Behavior, Incentives for Innovation},
filename={Gilbert Newbery (1982) - Preemptive Patenting And The Persistence Of Monopoly.pdf}
}
@article{joshi2011strategic,
title={When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industry},
author={Joshi, A.M. and Nerkar, A.},
journal={Strategic Management Journal},
volume={32},
number={11},
pages={1139--1160},
year={2011},
publisher={Wiley Online Library},
abstract={Research and development (R&D) consortia are specialized strategic alliances that shape the direction and scope of firm innovation activities. Little research exists on the performance conse- quences of participating in R&D consortia. We study the effect of patent pools, a unique form of R&D consortia, on firm performance in innovation. While prior research on alliances generally implies that patent pools enhance firm innovation, our study finds the opposite. Analyzing data on systemic innovation in the global optical disc industry, we find that patent pool formation substan- tially and significantly decreases both the quantity and quality of patents subsequently generated by licensors and licensees relative to the patenting activity of nonparticipants. Our empirical findings suggest that patent pools actually inhibit, rather than enhance, systemic innovation by participating firms.},
discipline={Econ, Management},
research_type={Econometric Model},
industry={General},
tags={Patent Pools},
filename={Joshi Nerkar (2011) - When Do Strategic Alliances Inhibit Innovation By Firms.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2007ten,
title={Ten things to do about patent holdup of standards (and one not to)},
author={Lemley, M.A.},
journal={BCL Rev.},
volume={48},
pages={149},
year={2007},
abstract={A central fact about the information technology sector is the multiplicity of patents that innovators must deal with. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of patents cover semiconductor, software, telecommunica- tions, and Internet inventions. Because of the nature of information technology, innovation often requires the combination of a number of different patents. Currently, various features of the patent system facili- tate holdup, particularly in the standard-setting context. These features include insufficient discounting in damages for patent infringement and the resultant inflated demands for royalties, the low standard of proof for willful infringement, which allows patentees to recover treble damages, and the threat of injunctive relief. Frequently, innovators make irreversible investments in their development of new technology, only to have those investments used against them as a bargaining chip by existing patent holders. This Article suggests five steps that standard-setting organizations may take to reduce the problem of patent holdup and five ways the law should change to deal with the problem.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Policy},
industry={ICT, Technology},
tags={RAND, Licensing, Patent Holdup, SSO},
filename={Lemley (2007) - Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards And One Not To.pdf}
}
@article{marco2008therole,
title = {The Role of Patent Rights in Mergers: Consolidation in Plant Biotechnology},
author = {Marco, Alan C. and Gordon C. Rausser},
journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics},
volume = {90},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 133-151},
abstract = {Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using firm-level patent data for firms in plant biotechnology, we develop a measure of patent enforceability. Duration models show that patent statistics are useful predictors of the timing of consolidation and that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of consolidation. Acquisitions in plant biotechnology may be motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies; some merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology, as exemplified by the case of Roundup Ready corn.},
year = {2008},
publisher = {Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association},
copyright = {Copyright © 2008 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association},
abstract={Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using firm-level patent data for firms in plant biotechnology, we develop a measure of patent enforceability. Duration models show that patent statistics are useful predictors of the timing of consolidation and that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of consolidation. Acquisitions in plant biotechnology may be motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies; some merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology, as exemplified by the case of Roundup Ready corn.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Mathematical},
industry={Agriculture, Biotechnology},
tags={Patent statistics},
filename={Marco Rausser (2008) - The Role Of Patent Rights In Mergers.pdf}
}
@article{murray2006when,
title = {When Ideas Are Not Free: The Impact of Patents on Scientific Research},
author = {Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott},
journal = {Innovation Policy and the Economy},
volume = {7},
number = {},
pages = {pp. 33-69},
abstract = {This chapter describes the impact of formal intellectual property rights on the production and diffusion of "dual knowledge"-ideas that are simultaneously of value as a scientific discovery and as a useful, inventive construct. We argue that a great deal of knowledge generated in academia, particularly in the life sciences, falls into this category (sometimes referred to as Pasteur's Quadrant). The production and diffusion of dual purpose knowledge challenges the premise of most science policy analysis, which is implicitly based on a clear separation between basic scientific knowledge and applied knowledge useful in the development of new technology. Instead, dual knowledge simultaneously makes both a basic and an applied contribution. We review qualitative and quantitative evidence relating to the policy challenges raised by the production and dissemination of dual knowledge, highlighting three broad findings. First, rather than facing a fundamental tradeoff between applied research and more fundamental scientific knowledge, research agencies can and do invest in dual purpose knowledge. Indeed, the dual purpose knowledge framework suggests a distinct rationale for public sector involvement in the funding and conduct of research: the social impact of a given piece of knowledge may be enhanced when knowledge is produced and disclosed in accordance with the norms of the scientific research community (particularly compared to secrecy). Second, we suggest that, within Pasteur's Quadrant, the increased use of formal IPR seems to be significantly shaping the structure, conduct and performance of both university and industry researchers. On the one hand, from the perspective of individual researchers, patenting does not seem to come at the expense of scientific publication, and both respond to the process of scientific discovery. There is some evidence, however, that patent grant may reduce the extent of use of knowledge: the citation rate to a scientific article describing a dual-purpose discovery experiences a modest decline after patent rights are granted over that knowledge. Finally, the impact of patents may be indirect; rather than directly impacting behavior through patent enforcement, scientific conduct may be affected through related mechanisms such as material transfer agreements. Not simply a legal document within a seamless web of cooperation, nor a bludgeon to stop scientific progress in its tracks, patents seem to be changing the "rules of the game" for scientific exchange, cooperation, and credit.},
year = {2006},
publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
copyright = {Copyright © 2006 The National Bureau of Economic Research},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Empirics},
industry={Academic Research, General},
tags={Licensing, scientific research productivity},
filename={Murray Stern (2006) - When Ideas Are Not Free The Impact Of Patents On Scientific Research.pdf}
}
@article{parchomovsky2005patent,
title = {Patent Portfolios},
author = {Gideon Parchomovsky and Wagner, R. Polk},
journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
volume = {154},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 1-77},
abstract = {This article develops a comprehensive theory of patent value, responding to growing empirical evidence that the traditional appropriability premise of patents is fundamentally incomplete in the modern innovation environment. We find that for patents, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: the true value of patents lies not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of related patents a patent portfolio.The patent portfolio theory thus explains what is known as "the patent paradox": in recent years patent intensity patents obtained per research and development dollar has risen dramatically even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished. We find the benefits of patent portfolios to be so significant as to suggest that firms9 patenting decisions are largely unrelated to the expected value of individual patents; because patent portfolios simultaneously increase both the scale and the diversity of available marketplace protections for innovations, firms will typically seek to obtain a large quantity of related patents, rather than evaluating their actual worth. The result?which we find widely recognized in commercial circles?is that the modem patenting environment exhibits (and requires) a high-volume, portfolio-based approach that is at odds with scholars' traditional assumptions. The implications of the portfolio theory of patents are important and wide spread. First, the explanatory power of the theory allows resolution not only of the patent paradox, but also of many of the otherwise puzzling observable patterns in the modern patenting environment, such as firm-size differences in patent intensity and litigation rates. Second, the patent portfolio theory neatly complements the prior theories that have sought to explain modern patent value, strengthening their relationship with the reality of patenting behavior, and confirming that the value of patents has expanded beyond traditionalist notions. Third, the patent portfolio theory offers a number of important predic tive insights into future trends in the patent system, allowing policymakers and scholars to frame their inquiry within a range of likely outcomes. In our analysis, the patent portfolio theory does not suggest a better, brighter future for the patent system, but does build a foundation for the important academic and policy-related work that springs from this initial treatment.},
year = {2005},
publisher = {The University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
copyright = {Copyright © 2005 The University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory, Discussion, Industry Statistics},
industry={General},
tags={Patent Portfolio theory, proliferation of patent thickets, patent paradox},
filename={Parchomovsky Wagner (2005) - Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
@article{pray2005innovation,
title={Innovation and dynamic efficiency in plant biotechnology: An introduction to the researchable issues},
author={Pray, C. and Oehmke, J.F. and Naseem, A.},
year={2005},
publisher={AgBioForum},
abstract={The agricultural biotechnology industry is characterized by heavy investment in research and development, dynamic technical change, and increasing concentration in both the output market and the ownership of intellectual properties that support ongoing innovation. This raises questions about the industry’s ability to continue to deliver path-breaking innovations. This paper lays out these questions, describes the relevant data (including the newly available agricultural biotechnology intellectual property database), and provides a conceptual framework for addressing the questions. The empirical discussion and conceptual framework in this paper constitute a structure upon which the remaining articles in this issue build to address the overall question of how best we can maintain socially desirable rates of innovation and dynamic efficiency in plant biotechnology.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Discussion},
industry={Biotech},
tags={Industry structure, innovation},
filename={Pray Oehmke Naseem (2005) - Innovation And Dynamic Efficiency In Plant Biotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{reichman2007harmonization,
jstor_articletype = {research-article},
title = {Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty},
author = {Reichman, Jerome H. and Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper},
journal = {Duke Law Journal},
jstor_issuetitle = {},
volume = {57},
number = {1},
jstor_formatteddate = {Oct., 2007},
pages = {pp. 85-130},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040588},
ISSN = {00127086},
abstract = {In this Article, we contend that the World Intellectual Property Organization's proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) is premature. Developing countries are struggling to adjust to the heightened standards of intellectual property protection required by the TRIPS Agreement of 1994. With TRIPS, at least, these countries obtained side payments (in the form of trade concessions) to offset the rising costs of knowledge products. A free-standing instrument, such as the SPLT, would shrink the remaining flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement with no side payments and no concessions to the catch-up strategies of developing countries at different stages of technological advancement. More controversially, we argue that a deep harmonization would boomerang against even its developed country promoters by creating more problems than it would solve. There is no vision of a properly functioning patent system for the developed world that commands even the appearance of a consensus. The evidence shows, instead, that the worldwide intellectual property system has entered a brave new scientific epoch, in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas about how best to treat a daunting array of new technologies. The proposals for reconciling the needs of different sectors, such as information technology and biotechnology, pose hard, unresolved issues at a time when the costs of litigation are rising at the expense of profits from innovation. These difficulties are compounded by the tendency of universities to push patenting up stream, generating new rights to core methodologies and research tools. As new approaches to new technologies emerge in different jurisdictions, there is a need to gather empirical evidence to determine which, if any, of these still experimental solutions are preferable over time. Our argument need not foreclose other less intrusive options and measures surveyed in the Article that can reduce the costs of delaying harmonization. However, the international community should not rush to freeze legal obligations regarding the protection of intellectual property. It should wait until economists and policymakers better understand the dynamics of innovation and the role that patent rights play in promoting progress and until there are mechanisms in place to keep international obligations responsive to developments in science, technology, and the organization of the creative community.},
language = {English},
year = {2007},
publisher = {Duke University School of Law},
copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Duke University School of Law},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Theory},
industry={General},
tags={TRIPS, SPLT, WIPO, International, Patent Law},
filename={Reichman Dreyfuss (2007) - Harmonization Without Consensus.pdf}
}
