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*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G. (2010), "Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits", Working Paper
@article{siebert2010licensing,
title={Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits},
author={Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
year={2010},
abstract={Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.
Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits (view source)
Revision as of 16:33, 18 March 2013
, 16:33, 18 March 2013no edit summary
*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G. (2010), "Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits", Working Paper
@article{siebert2010licensing,
title={Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits},
author={Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
year={2010},
abstract={Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.
