Changes

'''Status:''' Old paper needs repurposing, perhaps into multiple papers. '''Co-authors:''' Jim Brander '''To do:''' Lit reviews '''Project Quality:''' All reasonably high '''Project Page:''' [[VC Acquisitions Paper]]  The original paper ([[Brander Egan (2007) - The Role of VCs in Acquisitions]]) had a full data rebuild, detailed on: the [[VC Acquisitions Paper]]page. We now have a number of possible papers that we could write:#The effects of VC on the returns to acquisitions#The role of Information Asymmetries (IA) in acquisitions of privately-held firms#Measuring IA (1) could be a JFQA Comment, describing how we get a different result from Masulis and Nahata (2011). This requires that we reconsile Masulis and Nahata's results (and perhaps Gompers and Xuan's too). (2) is probably the simplest paper to write. We will use continuous measures of IA, and perhaps compute new distance measures. (3) is best answered using a dataset on acquisition of public firms by public firms (i.e. really Mergers) All three papers need lit reviews doing first.

Nokia sues Apple, Apple sues Sumsung, Samsung sues Nokia, and so on. There's been an endless round of [[Patent Litigation]] between the mobile phone and tablet device manufactures of late. Could this be related to the nature of competition in the markets? Pharma firms apparently sueat every infringement, whereas large semiconductor incumbents apparently never sue each off (are they in a Mexican standoff?). Infringement is obvious for pharma firms and potentially non-obvious for semiconductor firms. NPEs always sue, but they have no production rents to worry about. Some device manufacturers try to shut each other out of the market with ITC injunctions, and sue weak firms...  ==Description== The project would try to describe at least some of the behaviour above using game theory (probably an infinitely repeated, full information game) and then use litigation data to show that the game models reality well.