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*Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]
*Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]
==2nd Half==
The second half was taught by Steve Tadelis([mailto:stadelis@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/tadelis_steven.aspx website]).
===Paper List===
The paper list by class number is as follows:
1.) '''Career Concerns'''
*Holmstrom B. (1999) "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), pp.169-182 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]
*Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3), pp.468-505 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1992)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf]
