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*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf]
*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]
* Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225.
* Laffont, J-J., and J.Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Chapter 11 (up to section 11.5 incl.).
* Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.
* Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.
