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*Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]
==Supporting Papers for Part 2== 8,9,10.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking''' *Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]*Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]*Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]*Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]*Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Informationand Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf] 11,12.) '''Applications to Non-Market Strategy''' *Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf]*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2009)%20-%20The%20Market%20For%20Legislative%20Influence%20Over%20Regulatory%20Policy.pdf COMING SOON]*Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf]*Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf]*Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dyck%20Morse%20Zingales%20(2008)%20-%20Who%20Blows%20the%20Whistle%20on%20Corporate%20Fraud.pdf pdf] 13.) '''Economic Policymaking ''' *Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]*Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]*Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf] 14,15.) '''Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments''' *Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]*Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(1996)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20Power%20Games%20and%20Economic%20Behavior.pdf pdf]*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]*Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(2004)%20-%20The%20Inefficient%20Use%20of%20Power%20Costly%20Conflict%20with%20Complete%20Information.pdf pdf] ==Links to Pages on Wikipedia==
The following construct and theorem definitions may be useful:
