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Part 1 is taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and the paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A1.zip Zip of all papers]):
1.) '''Spatial voting and legislative institutions'''([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture1.pdf Class Slides])
*Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20(1979)%20-%20Institutional%20Arrangements%20and%20Equilibrium%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models.pdf pdf]
*Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice 37, 503-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20Weingast%20(1981)%20-%20Structure%20Induced%20Equilibrium%20and%20Legislative%20Choice.pdf pdf]
*McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McKelvey%20(1976)%20-%20Intransitivities%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models%20and%20Some%20Implications%20for%20Agenda%20Control.pdf pdf]
2.) '''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock'''([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Class Slides])
*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]
