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#1.) Spatial voting and legislative institutions**Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. **Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice 37, 503-19.**Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice, 33, 27-43.**McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482.
#Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock**Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132.**Knight, B3. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1).**Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). #Externalities in voting games**Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291**Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–66.**Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4).
#4.) The efficiency of democracy**Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32.**Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400.**Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424.**Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35.
#5.) Competition and influence**Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50.**Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69.**Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32.
#6.) Corruption deterrence **Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19.**Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44.
#7.) The electoral control of politicians **Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42.**Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25.
no edit summary
Part 1 is taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and the paper list by class number is as follows:
2.) Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock
*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132.
*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1).
*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4).
