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=== What problems If the Glorious Revolution was indeed about establishing property rights, one might arise expect that in this quantitative analysis?=== months where Parliament's army was winning, we would see greater levels of investment by private individuals -- in anticipation of an eventual Parliamentary victory that would secure their investment from the monarch. Investors might have the opposite reaction to the Monarch's victories.
==Empirical Questions: ===== What's the author's hypothesis? === === How it is tested? === === What do the tests achieve? === === How could the tests be improved? === === What are the tests' strengths and weaknesses? === === Can you think of any alternative empirical testsproblems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===
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==Theory Questions: ==
=== What is the author's topic and hypothesis? ===
The author believes that England was able to develop its economy and dominate the world because it had a secure property rights system. This enabled investment and growth.
=== How does the author test the hypothesis? ===
The paper doesn't include a formal model or an empirical section authors compare the growth of England to countries in continental Europe who do not have separation of powers and where there was no veto-- it is mostly check on the monarchy. In these countries, growth and property rights were hindered by the lack of a description of historical eventscheck against the monarch. Spain and France are examples where the authors claims this was happening. The authors also point to the grown in English capital markets and particularly markets in private/public debt as evidence that the glorious revolution strengthened private property rights.
=== How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses? ===
There isn't much talk of alternative hypotheses here!
=== How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===
