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Hsu (2004) - What Do Entrepreneurs Pay For Venture Capital Affiliation (view source)
Revision as of 18:40, 26 June 2011
, 18:40, 26 June 2011New page: *This page is referenced in The NBER Entrepreneurship Research Boot Camp Page ==Reference(s)== *Hsu, David (2004), "Wh...
*This page is referenced in [[Entrepreneurship_Research_Boot_Camp#Venture_Capital_Financing | The NBER Entrepreneurship Research Boot Camp Page]]
==Reference(s)==
*Hsu, David (2004), "What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation?", Journal of Finance, 59: 1805-1844 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hsu%20(2004)%20-%20What%20Do%20Entrepreneurs%20Pay%20For%20Venture%20Capital%20Affiliation.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
This study empirically evaluates the certification and value-added roles of reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start-ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing VCs at the first professional round of start-up funding, holding characteristics of the start-up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted, and high-reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10-14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs’ "extra-financial" value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These extra-financial services can have financial consequences.
==Reference(s)==
*Hsu, David (2004), "What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation?", Journal of Finance, 59: 1805-1844 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hsu%20(2004)%20-%20What%20Do%20Entrepreneurs%20Pay%20For%20Venture%20Capital%20Affiliation.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
This study empirically evaluates the certification and value-added roles of reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start-ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing VCs at the first professional round of start-up funding, holding characteristics of the start-up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted, and high-reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10-14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs’ "extra-financial" value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These extra-financial services can have financial consequences.
