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*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Heller, Michael A (1997), "Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, The", HARV. l. Rev., Vol.111, pp.621
@article{heller1997tragedy,
title={Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, The},
author={Heller, Michael A},
journal={HARV. l. Rev.},
volume={111},
pages={621},
year={1997},
abstract={Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full of goods? This article develops a theory of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse a tragedy of the commons. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse a tragedy of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores the dynamics of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range of property puzzles. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rights. },
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={All},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Governments may create anticommons property in developed market economies, as well as in transition countries. In the United States, vivid examples appear at the frontiers of Native American law and intellectual property protection.20 Whether anticommons tragedy emerges in a developed or transition economy, and whether it lasts for a short or long period, societies can avoid its social costs by creating more coherent initial endowments. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists and policymakers should pay more attention to the content of property bundles,2' rather than focusing just on the clarity of rights... Within United States law, powerful applications of the anticommons idea appear often in the intellectual property and the land use areas. In a forthcoming article, Rebecca Eisenberg and I use an anticommons analysis to show how increased patentability of basic biomedical research may lead to the development of fewer useful pharmaceutical products.},
thicket_def={#A, #B},
thicket_def_extract={In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. 11 When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the anticommons.12 Legal and economic scholars have mostly overlooked this tragedy, but...},
tags={Seminal Theory!},
filename={Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full of goods? This article develops a theory of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse a tragedy of the commons. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse a tragedy of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores the dynamics of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range of property puzzles. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rights.
Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons (view source)
Revision as of 16:33, 18 March 2013
, 16:33, 18 March 2013no edit summary
*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Heller, Michael A (1997), "Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, The", HARV. l. Rev., Vol.111, pp.621
@article{heller1997tragedy,
title={Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, The},
author={Heller, Michael A},
journal={HARV. l. Rev.},
volume={111},
pages={621},
year={1997},
abstract={Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full of goods? This article develops a theory of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse a tragedy of the commons. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse a tragedy of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores the dynamics of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range of property puzzles. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rights. },
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={All},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Governments may create anticommons property in developed market economies, as well as in transition countries. In the United States, vivid examples appear at the frontiers of Native American law and intellectual property protection.20 Whether anticommons tragedy emerges in a developed or transition economy, and whether it lasts for a short or long period, societies can avoid its social costs by creating more coherent initial endowments. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists and policymakers should pay more attention to the content of property bundles,2' rather than focusing just on the clarity of rights... Within United States law, powerful applications of the anticommons idea appear often in the intellectual property and the land use areas. In a forthcoming article, Rebecca Eisenberg and I use an anticommons analysis to show how increased patentability of basic biomedical research may lead to the development of fewer useful pharmaceutical products.},
thicket_def={#A, #B},
thicket_def_extract={In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. 11 When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the anticommons.12 Legal and economic scholars have mostly overlooked this tragedy, but...},
tags={Seminal Theory!},
filename={Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty while street kiosks in front are full of goods? This article develops a theory of anitcommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse a tragedy of the commons. In an anitcommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse a tragedy of the anitcommons. Anticommons property may appear whenever new property rights are being defined. For example in Moscow, multiple owners have been endowed initially with competing rights in each storefront, so no owner holds a useable bundle of rights and the store remains empty. Once an anticommons has emerged, collecting rights into private property bundles can be brutal and slow. This article explores the dynamics of anitcommons property in transition economies, formalizes the empirical material in a property theory framework, and then shows how the idea of anticommons property can be a useful new tool for understanding a range of property puzzles. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that property theorists might pay more attention to the content of the property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarify rights.
