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Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees (view source)
Revision as of 19:51, 19 May 2010
, 19:51, 19 May 2010no edit summary
Specialization is a predominant feature of informed decisionmaking in collective bodies. Alternatives are often initially evaluated by standing committees comprised of subsets of the membership. Committee members may have prior knowledge about policies in the committee's jurisdiction or may develop expertise on an ongoing basis. Specialization by committees can be an efficient way for the parent body to obtain costly information about the consequences of alternative policies. Indeed, some scholars have argued persuasively that acquisition of information is the raison d'etre for legislative committees (Cooper).
==Summary==
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
==The Model==
#A policy is choosen <math>p \in P \subset R^1 \mbox{ if } P^U\,</math> or <math>p \in \{p_0,b\} \mbox{ if } P^R\,</math>
#There are consequences and payoffs: <math>x, u_f, u_c\,</math> all determined
There are four games:
#Open rule and no specialization
#Open rule and specialization
#Closed rule and no specialization
#Closed rule and specialization
An equilibrium is a set of strategies <math>p^*(\cdot)\,</math>, <math>b^*(\cdot)\,</math> and <math>beliefs g^*(\cdot)\,</math> such that:
*<math>b^*(\omega)\,</math> maximizes <math>\mathbb{E}u_c\,</math>, given <math>p^*(b)\,</math>
*<math>p^*(b)\,</math> maximizes <math>\mathbb{E}u_f\,</math>, given <math>g^*(b)\,</math>
*<math>g^*(b) \subseteq [0,1]\,</math> for all <math>b\,</math> and <math>g^*(b)=\{\omega | b = b^*(\omega)\}\,</math> whenever <math>g^*(b)\,</math> is non-empty
Furthermore the decision to specialize must maximise the committee's expected utility and likewise the decision to choose a proceedure must maximise the floor's expect utility. (Both are formalized in the paper).
The paper makes two efficiency distinctions:
#The outcome is only Pareto optimal iff <math>x \in [0,x_c]\,</math>
#The game is expertise efficient iff the choice to specialize maximizes the expected total surplus.
===Open rule, no specialization===
The equilibrium is:
:<math>b^* \in P, \quad p*(b) = -\overline{\omega}, \quad g^*(b) = {w|w \in [0,1]}\,</math>
The expected utilities are:
:<math>\mathbb{E}u_f = -\sigma_{\omega}^2\,</math>
:<math>\mathbb{E}u_c = -\sigma_{\omega}^2 - x_c^2\,</math>
Outcomes are Pareto Optimal iff:
:<math>\omega \in [\overline{\omega}, x_c + \overline{\omega}]\,</math>
