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2.) '''Thinking Institutionally: The Problem of Commitment'''
*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1983) - Credible Commitments Using Hostages To Support Exchange |Williamson, Oliver, (1983)]], "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]*[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]
*Telser, Lester (1981), "A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, 27-44. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Telser%20(1981)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Self-Enforcing%20Agreements.pdf pdf]
*Hodgson, G.M. (2004), "Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy," Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2), April, 401-418. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hodgson%20(2004)%20-%20Opportunism%20is%20not%20the%20only%20reason%20why%20firms%20exist.pdf pdf]
*Gibbons, Robert (2004), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?" (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2004)%20-%20Four%20Formalizable%20Theories%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]
*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System", The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. pp. 972-991 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Firm%20as%20an%20Incentive%20System.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]
*Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983), "Agency Problems and Residual Claims", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 327-349. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fama%20Jensen%20(1983)%20-%20Agency%20Problems%20and%20Residual%20Claims.pdf pdf]
*Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen (1983), "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution. (Jun.), pp. 301-325. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fama%20Jensen%20(1983)%20-%20Separation%20of%20Ownership%20and%20Control.pdf pdf]
11.) '''Bureaucracy'''
*Spiller, Pablo (1990), "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]], "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]
*Prendergast, Canice (2003), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]
*Dixit, Avinash (2002), "Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review", The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Autumn), pp. 696-727. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20(2002)%20-%20Incentives%20and%20Organizations%20in%20the%20Public%20Sector.pdf pdf]
*Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]
*Goldberg (1976), "Regulation and Administered Contracts", Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, pp. 426-448. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1976)%20-%20Regulation%20and%20Administered%20Contracts.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1976) - Franchise Bidding For Natural Monopolies | Williamson, Oliver E. (1976)]], "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1976)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]
*Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]
*Troesken, W. (1997), "The sources of public ownership: Historical evidence from the gas industry", Journal of Law Economics & Organization, April, Vol. 13, pp. 1-25. (Optional Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Troesken%20(1997)%20-%20The%20sources%20of%20public%20ownership.pdf pdf]
*Greif, Avner (1993), "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition", American Economic Review, 83 (3), 525-548. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Greif%20(1993)%20-%20Contract%20Enforceability%20and%20Economic%20Institutions%20in%20Early%20Trade.pdf pdf]
Note that, aside from these two papers, class 14 was left unspecified. A number of papers may have been set in class.
Seminal but not included:
*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
