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Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control (view source)
Revision as of 18:39, 16 September 2011
, 18:39, 16 September 2011no edit summary
Programs are characterized by B, T (total benefits and total taxes). P (programs) are characterized by <math>B/T, P\in[0,\inf]</math>.
* <math>B: \{b|b_{i}>0, i=1,2,3,...,n, \sum b_{i}\leq B\{}</math>
* T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>.
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>.
... unfinished. Sorry.
Open rule:
* Never get universalism w/ inefficient program.
* Inefficent program minimum winning coalition (MWC).
* Amendments shift power to voters with inefficiency.
* Set of proposals which are adopted is smaller.
