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Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures (view source)
Revision as of 17:52, 16 September 2011
, 17:52, 16 September 2011→Open Rule: Infinite session
In equilibrium, the game procedes sequentially until nature randomly selects an amender who is in the coalition of the original proposer, when the proposal is approved.
====Proof ====
Let <math>y^{a}</math> be what proposer (j) keeps for self m members have continuation values offered to <math>V_{j}^{m}(y^{j})</math> be the value of the game to <math>j</math> when <math>y^{j}</math> is on the floor.
Note: Stationarity implies that <math>y^{j\ast}</math> will be the same in all recognized rounds.
Note: N members, member 1 is recognized, member j is excluded member recognized, member
A: <math>\frac{1-\hat{y}^{a}}{m}\geq \delta V_{i}(y^{i})</math>. This means that the amendment <math>\max V_{i}^{m^{ast}(y_{i}).
<\math>
==== Substantive conclusions ====
* Possibility of delay.
* Size of winning coalition can be larger than the minimum winning coalition.
* <math>\frac{\partial m}{\partial \delta}<0</math>. <math>\frac{\partial m}{\partial n}<0</math> (Rui says this needs to be checked.
* More equal because proposer spreads wealth more broadly.
