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Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures (view source)
Revision as of 17:42, 16 September 2011
, 17:42, 16 September 2011→Open Rule: Infinite session
The equilibrium strategy is as follows:
* If recognized, keep <math>\hat{y}^{a}</math> for yourself and distribute the remainder to <math>m(\delta,n)<\math> other members, where <math>1-n>= \geq m >= \geq (n-1)n</math>. <math>1>m/2\geq 1/2</math>.
* If recognized as an amender who is part of the aforementioned group of <math>m</math>: Move to a vote.
* If recognized as an amender who is NOT part of the aforementioned group of <math>m</math>: Make a proposal to keep <math>\hat{y}^{a}</math> for yourself and distribute the remainder to <math>m(\delta,n)<\math> other members -- including all those who are not in the first proposer's majority. Recognizer is never included because he is too expensive to pay off.
