Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures (view source)
Revision as of 17:41, 16 September 2011
, 17:41, 16 September 2011→In the Paper
Difference in equality between proposer and coalition members=<math>\Delta=1-\frac{\delta(n-1)}{2n}-\frac{\delta}{n}</math>. <math>\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial n}=\frac{\delta}{n}>0</math>. Coalition members also worse off as legislature size gets bigger.
===In the PaperOpen Rule: Infinite session===<i>Editor: What about open rule finite session? Doesn't seem to be in the paper anywhere</i>.
Open rule: Member is recognized and makes a proposal. Another member is recognized and can either move the previous question to a vote agains the status quo (which is zero for everyone), or offer an alterative proposal to be voted against the previous proposal. If first proposal ends: Game over. If amendment wins -- another recognition round to offer proposal. The role of equilibrium strategy is as follows: * If recognized, keep <math>\hat{y}^{a}</math> for yourself and distribute the majority rule remainder to <math>m(\delta,n)<\math> other members, where <math>1-n\geq m \geq (rather than say unaminityn-1) n</math>. <math>1>m/2\geq 1/2</math>. * If recognized as an amender who is covered in part of the paper, aforementioned group of <math>m</math>: Move to a vote. * If recognized as an amender who is NOT part of the case aforementioned group of <math>m</math>: Make a proposal to keep <math>\hat{y}^{a}</math> for yourself and distribute the remainder to <math>m(\delta,n)<\math> other members -- including all those who are not in the first proposer's majority. Recognizer is never included because he is too expensive to pay off. * If you're a voter: Same rules as above. Vote for whichever pays you higher, and for the stationary amendement if you're indifferent. In equilibrium for , the game procedes sequentially until nature randomly selects an open-ruleamender who is in the coalition of the original proposer, when the proposal is approved.
