Changes

===Closed Rule - Infinite Sessions===

From proposition 2 in the paper, if:

<math>1 > \delta > \frac{(n+2)}{2(n-1)} \mbox{ and } n \ge 5\,</math>

then: '''Any distribution of benefits (<math>x\,</math>) may be supported'''.

However, this is unsatisfactory as it requires a complete history at all points (which is unrealistic if <math>\delta\,</math> is a reelection probability and new members can't know the history), and if a member were indifferent between enforcing and not, it is only weakly credible.

To restrict the equilibrium space the paper considers '''Stationary Equilibrium'''.

*The first vote recieves a majority, so the legislature completes in one session

===In the Paper===

The role of the majority rule (rather than say unaminity) is covered in the paper, as is the case of the stationary equilibrium for an open-rule.