Changes

Suppose that the firm can fight back with intensity <math>f \ge 0\,</math>, where <math>k(f)\,</math> is the cost of fighting (increasing and convex), and that <math>\theta \in (0,\infty)\,</math> is the public's support for the firmcampaign. Then the probability of success is defined as:

The Assume the campaign lasts for a duration 1, and the target chooses to fight or not at time 0, A fight lasts for <math>\delta \in \left[0,1\right)\,</math>.

====Extenstion Extension to this Sub-Model====

Extentions Extensions include:*Opportunistic Behavior - the activist makes the most aggressive demand it can if it wins, so in equilibrium, target will fight*Committment Commitment not to act opportunistically - the activist commits to get the firm not increase demand if it wins, so campaign will be less aggressive, thus inducing responsive target to accept and recalcitrant target to yield by choosing a campaign that avoids fightingfight