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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 20:09, 29 October 2009
, 20:09, 29 October 2009no edit summary
<math>z_g^-(x,y)\,</math> is strictly increasing in <math>x\,</math>: A more extreme alternative leads moderate interests not to try to change the policy.
Also as <math>x \uparrow</math> the #votes recruited <math>\downarrow</math>, and as <math>x \uparrow</math> the cost of recruiting a vote increases<math>\uparrow</math>.
It is also possible to calculate when vote recruitment becomes too costly all together for the interest. This is covered in some detail in the paper, but loosely if <math>x > x^*(z_g,0)=\frac{8 \beta z_g}{4 \beta + \alpha}\,</math>, the the cost exceeds the gain.
