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==Introduction==
Baron (2001) provides some theoretical foundations for client politics and interest group politics in both Majority Rule institutions and executive institutions. The paper focuses on complete information settings and does not explicitly consider re-election, though it is noted that contributions are likely to be used to this end.
The models considered are:
#Vote recruitment in client politics (with majority rule institutions)
##Extension to supermajority rule
##Extension to bicameral legislatures
##Extension to presidential veto
#Agenda setting strategies and vote recruitment in client politics
##Extension to consider uncertainty over the location of ideal points
##Extension to consider uncertainty over teh intensity of preferences
#Analysis of Bargaining Power in interest group politics
#Analysis of incentive to undertake nonmarket strategies in client/interest group politics
#Forming coalitions for vote recruitment in client politics (cost sharing)
#Rent chain mobilization in client politics
#Interest group competition with an executive institution
#Interest group competition in a majority rule institution
##Vote Recruitment
##Agenda Setting
==Basic Definitions==
*In '''Client politics''' the firm or interest group has no direct competition in its lobbying or influencing efforts.
*In '''Interest group politics''' two one or more firms directly compete in their efforts to influence policy(note that client politics is a subset of interest group politics, but we will use the term interest group politics to discuss the case of multiple lobbyists).
*'''Majority Rule institutions''' are legislatures or similar bodies that who require a majority vote to pass legislation. Thus Majority Rule institutions are synonymous with median vote type problems.
*'''Executive institutions''' are those in which a single individual, or a group of individuals that hare identical preference and so can be represented by a single representative agent, are empowered to choose and enact policy.
 
==Majority Rule Institutions==
 
Key to the analysis of Majority Rule institutions is the notion of pivotal legislators, and the trade-off between costs and benefits for the lobbyist(s). Building a majority is inherently costly, and so majority building naturally focuses on the legislators who are easiest to recruit. Legislators who would vote to support a policy absent of lobbying efforts are not provided with additional (costly) resources.
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