Changes

'''Story:'''

Interest sets agenda (chosen policy against status quo) or it is exogenous -> Legislators have additively seperable utility over preferences (with intensity) and money -> Interests buy pivotal legislators making them indifferent to chosen policy with money (or don't bother if they are not extreme) ->

====Two Interests with an Executive (2 principals, 1 agent)====

'''Solution concept:'''

Use local truth telling and linear contribution schedules. Solve by maximizing joint surplus to determine equilibrium outcome, and contrast with maximizing joint surplus without one principal to determine that principals needed transfer.

===[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron and Diermeier (2007)]]===

'''Story:'''

Activist targets firm and makes demand, promising reward and harm -> Firm is either strategic or recalcitrant -> If expected gain is positive activist conducts campaign -> firm gets harmed or rewarded according to actions. With commitment not to act -> Firms may take preempive action and self-regulate to avoid harm. With reputations -> soft (responsive firms) may play hard to deter activists, but then activists are more aggressive to hard firms. The firm may also contest the campaign.

===[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron and Ferejohn (1989)]]===

'''Story:'''

Play split the pie with n (odd) members -> Strategies and outcomes depend on voting rule (e.g. majority), amendment rule (open or closed) and number of periods (and players) -> under the closed rule, 2 periods, majority rule -> agenda power gives first mover advantage -> recruit cheapest votes in terms of recognition probabilities (lowest) -> in terms of ex-ante expected utility those with higher recognition probabilities will have the lowest ex-ante value for the game -> with equal probability can randomly choose partners.

===[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo and Edwards (2007)]]===

Empirical paper - test of [[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron (2001)]] - Two Interests with an Executive (2 principals, 1 agent).

===[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo (2002)]]===

In Insulation Game: Same as above but can insulate and recieve a reduced payoff for all time -> Can trade benefits in power for benefits out of power -> more uncertainty over who will move next leads to more insulation if costs of insulating are not too high. Insulating is inefficient.

===[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon (1994)]]===

'''Story'''(for the private info version): Status quo to start -> A makes unilateral choice of outcome -> B can acquiese or go to war -> if acquiese end, if war, outcome decided by common knowledge random outcome p and parties pay costs -> A wants to push B back to reservation level (p+c) but doesn't know c (or p) -> faces trade off of more territory against greater risk and makes it -> positive risk of war.

===[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)]]===

'''Story:''' Two sectors of the economy -> Reform will make one sector's workers better off and the other worse off, but overall a majority better off -> individuals don't know their cost of switching draws and so don't know if they can switch -> worker in the sector that is made worse off may vote against the reform even though they could pay the switching cost and be made better off by the reform.

===[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)]]===

'''Story:''' One party can specialize at a cost and learn the true state of the world -> Another party (with different preferences) makes the decisions and set the proceedural rules (open vs. closed) -> Supposing open and no specialization, then no information is learnt and an expectation is used as a posterior; Supposing open and specialization then partitions can be used to communicate some information as in a cheap talk model; Supposing closed and no specialization, the committee can force the agenda relative to the status quo; and for closed with specialization there is perfect communications for extreme values and noisy signalling for non-extreme values. Over specialization is possible.

===[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting (2009)]]===