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*[[Demsetz (1968) - Why Regulate Utilities |Demsetz, Harold (1968)]], "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]
*Laffont, JJ and J. Tirole(1993)"A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation - Chapter 1
13.-14.) '''Regulatory Capture & Rents and Institutions in the electoral Control of Politicians'''
*[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
*[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
====Rui's Paper List====
