Changes

Slide Sets referenced areThe paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A2.zip Zip of part 2 papers]):*3-4.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking'''Voting institutions*[[Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms]], American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]*[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]], Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf] *[[Baron, commitment vs flexibilityD. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and gridlock''' Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/repositorypdfs/PHDBA279AGilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-Lecture2%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf Slides #2pdf]*Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf] 7.) '''Externalities in voting gamesApplications to Non-Market Strategy''' *[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repositorypdfs/PHDBA279ABaron%20(2001)%20-Lecture4%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf Slides #41999 Working Paper pdf])*'''[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]], Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The efficiency Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2009)%20-%20The%20Market%20For%20Legislative%20Influence%20Over%20Regulatory%20Policy.pdf pdf]*[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]], Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of democracy''' Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repositorypdfs/PHDBA279ABaron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-Lecture6%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf Slides #62006 Draft Paper pdf])*13.) '''Competition Whistleblowing and influenceDelay''' *[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]], Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279AAustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-Lecture7%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides #7])*Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dyck%20Morse%20Zingales%20(2008)%20-%20Who%20Blows%20the%20Whistle%20on%20Corporate%20Fraud.pdf pdf]*[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]], Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf] 14.) '''Corruption deterrenceEconomic Policymaking ''' *[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991)]], Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/repositorypdfs/PHDBA279AFernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-Lecture8%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf Slides #8pdf]*[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J. (1994)]], Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf] *15,16.) '''The electoral control of politiciansPolitical Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments''' *Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/repositorypdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]*Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(1996)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20Power%20Games%20and%20Economic%20Behavior.pdf pdf]*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]*[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002)]], Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279AdeFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-Lecture9%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf Slides #9pdf]*Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(2004)%20-%20The%20Inefficient%20Use%20of%20Power%20Costly%20Conflict%20with%20Complete%20Information.pdf pdf]  See also: [[BPP Political Science]]