Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
#2.) '''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([[Romerhttp://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Lecture 2 Class Slides])*Messner, TM. and HM. Rosenthal Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(19781) , 115- Political Resource Allocation132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]*Knight, Controlled Agendas and B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the Status Quo|RomerStates, TJournal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www. and Hedegan. Rosenthal com/pdfs/Knight%20(19782000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]. Presentation in 2011 version of class: [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/c/c9/Knight_Presentation.pdf pdf] "Political Resource Allocation. *Dal Bó, E. (2006), Controlled Agendas and the Status QuoCommittees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Choice" 33, 27-43Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/RomerDal%20Rosenthal20Bo%20(19782006)%20-%20Political20Committees%20Resource20With%20Allocation,20Supermajority%20Controlled20Voting%20Agendas20Yield%20and%20the20Commitment%20Status20With%20Quo20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
→Class 1: Spacial Voting and Legislative institutions
====Dal Bo====
====Class 1: Spacial Voting and Legislative institutions====
1.) '''Spatial voting and legislative institutions''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture1.pdf Lecture 1 Class Slides])
*Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20(1979)%20-%20Institutional%20Arrangements%20and%20Equilibrium%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models.pdf pdf]
*Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice", 37, 503-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20Weingast%20(1981)%20-%20Structure%20Induced%20Equilibrium%20and%20Legislative%20Choice.pdf pdf]
*Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf]
*McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472?482. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McKelvey%20(1976)%20-%20Intransitivities%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models%20and%20Some%20Implications%20for%20Agenda%20Control.pdf pdf]
#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
