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→Dal Bo
===Dal Bo===
#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Lecture 9 Class Slides])#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Lecture 6 Class Slides])#[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Lecture 8 Class Slides])#[[Coate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995)]], On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Lecture 6 Class Slides])#[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E. (2007)]], Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Lecture 4 Class Slides]) #[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Lecture 7 Class Slides])#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Lecture 9 Class Slides])
#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]
#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]