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#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
#[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multitask Principal Agent Analyses |Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]
#'''''[[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978)]]''''', "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Levy Spiller (1994) - The Institutional Foundations Of Regulatory Commitment |Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994)]]''''', "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Mccubbins Schwartz (1984) - Congressional Oversight Overlooked |McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984)]]''''', "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]
#[[Mccubbins Noll Weingast (1987) - Administrative Procedures As Instruments Of Control |
McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987)]], "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]
#[[North (1991) - Institutions |North, Douglass (1991)]]. "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]
#[[Prendergast (2003) - The Limits Of Bureaucratic Efficiency |Prendergast, Canice (2003)]], "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]
#'''''[[Spiller (2008) - An Institutional Theory Of Public Contracts Regulatory Implications |Spiller, Pablo (2008)]]''''', "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Spiller Gely (1992) - Congressional Control Or Judicial Independence |Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992)]]''''', "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]
#[[Weingast Marshall (1988) - The Industrial Organization Of Congress |Weingast and Marshall (1988)]], "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]
#[[Whinston (2003) - On The Transaction Costs Determinants Of Vertical Integration |Whinston (2003)]], "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]
#[[Defigueiredo Spiller Urbiztondo (1999) - An Informational Perspective On Administrative Procedures | De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999)]], "An informational perspective on administrative procedures", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]
#[[Spiller (1990) - Politicians Interest Groups And Regulators | Spiller, Pablo (1990)]], "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]
==Polictical Science==
