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BPP Field Exam 2010 Answers (view source)
Revision as of 18:51, 28 March 2011
, 18:51, 28 March 2011no edit summary
(b) <i>My answer, assuming that some shares can be different</i>.
If some shares can be different, then the optimal contract is where some number $<math>M<N$ </math> workers get $<math>s_{i}=\frac{1}{z}$</math>, and the remainder get $<math>s_{i}=0$</math>. $<math>M$ </math> is the largest number such that $<math>\frac{M}{Z}\leq 1$</math>. $<math>M$ </math> workers will provide effort, and $<math>N-M$ </math> workers will shirk.
<b>Question B1.2</b>