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Assuming the game is single-shot (a finite number of sessions will be held to consider distribution proposals for the surplus), we make the additional assumption that if no allocation is agreed in the final period, then the surplus is not distributed and all partners end up with 0. If so, we have a simple application of Baron & Ferejohn (1989) - [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/index.php/Baron_Ferejohn_%281989%29_-_Bargaining_In_Legislatures#Closed_Rule_-_Two_Sessions Close Rule, Finite Session (e.g. n=2)]. Backwards induction thus yields a SPNE in which each member, if recognized, makes the same majoritarian proposal to distribute the benefits to a minimal winning majority (characterized in Proposition 1). For simplicity, normalize the total surplus to 1, and consider n=2 sessions. In equilibrium, the first partner (randomly selected in the first session), proposes an allocation of <math>\frac{\delta}{n}\,</math> to any <math>(n-1)/2\,</math> other randomly selected partners (this is their continuation value for being selected with probability <math>\frac{1}{n}\,<\math> and claiming the entire surplus of 1 (discounted by <math>\delta\,</math> in the next and final period) and proposes to keep the remaining <math> 1 - \frac{\delta(n-1)}{2n}\,</math> for himself. The proposal is approvedby the proposer plus his <math>(n-1)/2\,</math> allies receiving positive shares, and the game ends in the first period. Note that the proposer receives the largest share (ranging between <math>1-\frac{\delta}{3} - 1-\frac{\delta}{2}\,</math>) due to the agenda power of going first, and the institutional setup of the closed rule, which excludes amendments from immediate consideration by the voting body.