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This page is part of the Patent Thicket Litature Review
Contents
Notes
This page contains the Discards Processed BibTeX. BibTeX entries should be added to this list when they are determined to be not up, down or core group.
Discards
Discard From Up Group By Ed (Apr 2nd)
@article{cotter2008patent,
title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses},
author={Cotter, T.F.},
journal={J. Corp. L.},
volume={34},
pages={1151},
year={2008},
publisher={HeinOnline},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={n recent years, influential scholars, 1 practicing lawyers, 2 government officials, 3 government commissions, 4 enforcement agencies, 5 and courts 6 have all identified the phenomenon of "patent holdup" as a serious problem that may require various reforms to both patent and antitrust law. Within the last year or so, however, critics of this view have become increasingly vocal. In two recent papers, for example, Damien Geradin and his coauthors argue that, as an empirical matter, the frequency and magnitude of patent holdup costs are exaggerated. 7 A second line of attack, taken up in recent work by scholars including Einer Elhauge,8 John Golden,9 and J. Gregory Sidak,10 focuses more on perceived theoretical vulnerabilities of the patent holdup literature-arguing, for example, that holdup is not necessarily inefficient,11 and that neither patent law nor economic theory provides a baseline from which to evaluate whether patentees' royalty demands are so excessive as to constitute holdups. 12 Third, some of these same critics (and others) argue that the reforms sometimes proposed to remedy patent holdup-such as eliminating the presumption of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, changing the method by which courts calculate reasonable royalties, and permitting standard setting organizations (SSOs)13 to engage in collective bargaining with member patent owners over proposed licensing terms-threaten worse harms than the harms they would deter.},
thicket_def={Strategic Value},
thicket_def_extract={In this regard, I present a definition of patent holdup as a type of opportunistic behavior on the part of patent owners that threatens to impose (1) static deadweight losses that are not justified by likely increases in dynamic efficiency, or (2) dynamic efficiency losses due to reduction in the incentive to participate in standard setting organizations or to engage in follow-up innovation.},
tags={IPR Reform, Reasonable Royalty, Balance with Anti-trust, Private Mechanisms, SSOs},
filename={Cotter (2008) - Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust Responses.pdf}
}
@article{holman2012debunking,
title={Debunking the Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents},
author={Holman, C.M.},
journal={Nature Biotechnology},
volume={30},
number={3},
pages={240--244},
year={2012},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
abstract={The fear that human gene patents pose a threat to whole-genome sequencing is based largely on widely held misconceptions.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={Biology, Genetics},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={There is also good reason to think that even the claims most likely to be infringed, reciting short fragments of genomic DNA, or broadly defined methods of testing for genetic variation, would not necessarily be infringed by all forms of WGS, particularly next-generation technologies that do not amplify genes. A company that provides WGS services, but that leaves the job of analyzing the sequence data for clinically important variations to others, would be particularly unlikely to be found liable for infringing any of these gene patents.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Industry Commentary},
filename={Holman (2012) - Debunking The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene Patents.pdf}
}
@article{kieff2011removing,
title = {Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition},
author = {Kieff, F. Scott},
journal = {Supreme Court Economic Review},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 25-50},
year = {2011},
abstract = {Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is fast becoming almost devoid of significant property rule characteristics, at least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition. The basic intuition behind this bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of striking a deal with a different party. At the same time, liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to keep out new entrants. The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In the vast majority of the intellectual property (IP) literature, property rule treatment of IP is said to cause excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold- outs, and trolls, unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={IPR Reform, Liability},
filename={Kieff (2011) - Removing Property From Intellectual Property And Intended.pdf},
}
@article{serafino2007survey,
title={Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures},
author={Serafino, D.},
journal={Knowledge Ecology International. http://keionline. org/content/view/69/1},
year={2007},
abstract={The collective management of intellectual property rights is a term used to describe methods of managing large portfolios of intellectual property assets, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, know-how and data. Patent pools are one such mechanism. A “patent pool” is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties.2 In its 2001 White Paper on Patent Pools, the USPTO said, “A patent pool allows interested parties to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain technology in one place, e.g, ‘one-stop shopping,’ rather than obtaining licenses from each patent owner individually.”3 The following paper provides a summary of features of 35 patent pools organized or proposed from 1856 to the present. Each of the patent pools was organized in response to a particular set of policy objectives and circumstances. Their purposes were heterogeneous. Some were organized in order to promote the interests of monopolists or cartels. Others were organized to promote competition and benefit the users of patents. There are pools that manage the patents on standards for new information technologies, that enhance R&D for new biomedical or biotechnology agricultural products, or that seek to promote other objectives. Some pools are organized by patent owners, others by manufacturers, and yet others by non-profit institutions, including governments. There is no single reason for creating a patent pool and no single way to manage a patent pool.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Written Theory, Empirics},
industry={General, Technology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The Supreme Court ruled in 1947 that the division of the market by territory violated American antitrust laws, and included the contract between National Lead and DuPont in this ruling, which read, in part...The court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={The court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”28},
tags={Private Mechanisms, Patent Pools, Standards},
filename={Serafino (2007) - Survey Of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety Of Purposes And Management Structures.pdf},
}
@article{schmidt2007negotiating,
title={Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket},
author={Schmidt, C.},
journal={Nature biotechnology},
volume={25},
number={3},
pages={273--280},
year={2007},
publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-},
abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the RNAi field yet, but once products near the market, it might be a different story. Charlie Schmidt investigates.},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biology},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Industry Commentary, Private Mechanisms, Licensing},
filename={Schmidt (2007) - Negotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
Discard From Uncertain File By Kai
@article{arora2001markets,
title={Markets for technology and their implications for corporate strategy},
author={Arora, Ashish and Fosfuri, Andrea and Gambardella, Alfonso},
journal={Industrial and corporate change},
volume={10},
number={2},
pages={419--451},
year={2001},
abstract={We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters.},
iscipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
hicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Arora Fosfuri Gambardella (2001) - Markets For Technology And Their Implications For Corporate Strategy.pdf}
}
@article{beath1989strategic,
title={Strategic R \& D Policy},
author={Beath, John and Katsoulacos, Yannis and Ulph, David},
journal={The Economic Journal},
volume={99},
number={395},
pages={74--83},
year={1989},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
hicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
hicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Beath Katsoulacos Ulph (1989) - Strategic R And D Policy.pdf}
}
@techreport{bloom2007identifying,
title={Identifying technology spillovers and product market rivalry},
author={Bloom, Nicholas and Schankerman, Mark and Van Reenen, John},
year={2007},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
abstract={Government policies to support R&D are predicated on empirical evidence of R&D “spillovers” between firms. But there are two countervailing R&D spillovers: positive effects from technology spillovers and negative effects from business stealing by product market rivals. We develop a general framework showing that technology and product market spillovers have testable implications for a range of performance indicators, and exploit these using distinct measures of a firm’s position in technology space and product market space. We show using panel data on U.S firms between 1981 and 2001 that both technology and product market spillovers operate, but that net social returns are several times larger than private returns. The spillover effects are also revealed when we analyze three high-tech sectors in detail – pharmaceuticals, computer hardware and telecommunication equipment. Using the model we evaluate three R&D subsidy policies and show that the typical focus of support for small and medium firms may be misplaced.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Measures, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Bloom Schankerman VanReenen (2007) - Identifying Technology Spillovers And Product Market Rivalry.pdf}
}
@article{freeman1979centrality,
title={Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification},
author={Freeman, Linton C},
journal={Social networks},
volume={1},
number={3},
pages={215--239},
year={1979},
abstract={The intuitive background for measures of structural centrality in social networks is reviewed and existing measures are evaluated in terms of their consistency with intuitions and their interpretability. Three distinct intuitive conceptions of centrality are uncovered and existing measures are refined to embody these conceptions. Three measures are developed for each concept, one absolute and one relative measure of the centrality of positions in a network, and one reflecting the degree of centralization of the entire network. The implication of these measures for the experimental study of small groups is examined.},
discipline={Sociology},
research_type={Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Freeman (1979) - Centrality In Social Networks Conceptual Clarification.pdf}
}
@article{gilbert1997antitrust,
title={Antitrust issues in the licensing of intellectual property: The nine no-no's meet the nineties},
author={Gilbert, Richard and Shapiro, Carl and Kaplow, Louis and Gertner, Robert},
journal={Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics},
volume={1997},
pages={283--349},
year={1997},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Gilbert Shapiro Kaplow Gertner (1997) - Antitrust Issues In The Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
@article{hall2005market,
title={Market value and patent citations},
author={Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg},
year={2005},
abstract={This paper explores the usefulness of patent citations as a measure of the importance of a firm’s patents, as indicated by the stock market valuation of the firm’s intangible stock of knowledge. Using patents and citations for 1963-1999, we estimate Tobin’s q equations on the ratios of R&D to assets stocks, patents to R&D, and citations to patents. We find that each ratio significantly impacts market value, with an extra citation per patent boosting market value by 3%. Further findings indicate that “unpredictable” citations have a stronger effect than the predictable portion, and that self-citations are more valuable than external citations.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Measures, Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Hall (2005) - Market Value And Patent Citations.pdf}
}
@article{harhoff1999citation,
title={Citation frequency and the value of patented inventions},
author={Harhoff, Dietmar and Narin, Francis and Scherer, Frederic M and Vopel, Katrin},
journal={Review of Economics and statistics},
volume={81},
number={3},
pages={511--515},
year={1999},
abstract={Through a survey, private economic value estimates were obtained on 964 inventionis made in the United States and Germany and on which German patent renewal fees were paid to full-term expiration in 1995. A search of subsequent U.S. and German patents yielded counts of citations to those patents. Patents renewed to full-term were significantly more highly cited than patents allowed to expire before their full term. The higher an invention's economic value estimate was, the more the patent was subsequently cited.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Harhoff Narin Scherer Vopel (1999) - Citation Frequency And The Value Of Patented Inventions.pdf}
}
@misc{hausman1984econometric,
title={Econometric models for count data with an application to the patents-R\&D relationship},
author={Hausman, Jerry A and Hall, Bronwyn H and Griliches, Zvi},
year={1984},
abstract={This paper focuses on developing and adapting statistical models of counts (nonnegative integers) in the context of panel data and using them to analyze the relationship between patents and R&D expenditures. Since a variety of other economic data come in the form of repeated counts of some individual actions or events, the methodology should have wide applications. The statistical models we develop are applications and generalizations of the Poisson distribution. Two important issues are (i) Given the panel nature of our data, how can we allow for separate persistent individual (fixed or random) effects? (ii) How does one introduce the equivalent of disturbance-in-the-equation into the analysis of Poisson and other discrete probability functions? The first problem is solved by conditioning on the total sum of outcomes over the observed years, while the second problem is solved by introducing an additional source of randomness, allowing the Poisson parameter to be itself randomly distributed, and compounding the two distributions. Lastly, we develop a lest statistic for the presence of serial correlation when fixed effects estimators are used in nonlinear conditional models.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Measures},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Hausman Hall Griliches (1984) - Econometric Models For Count Data With An Application To The Patents R And D Relationship.pdf}
}
@article{henderson2006measuring,
title={Measuring competence? Exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research},
author={Henderson, Rebecca and Cockburn, Iain},
journal={Strategic management journal},
volume={15},
number={S1},
pages={63--84},
year={2006},
abstract={Renewed interest in the resource-based theory of the firm has focused attention on the role of heterogeneous organizational 'competence' in competition. This paper attempts to measure the importance of these effects in the context of pharmaceutical research. We distinguish between 'component' and 'architectural' competence, and using internal firm data at the program level from 10 major pharmaceutical companies show that together the two forms of competence appear to explain a signijicant fraction of the variance in research productivity across firms. Our results raise some intriguing questions about the nature of competencies and the ways in which they diffuse over time.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Measures},
industry={Biomedical},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Henderson Cockburn (2006) - Measuring Competence Exploring Firm Effects In Pharmaceutical Research.pdf}
}
@misc{jaffe1986technological,
title={Technological opportunity and spillovers of R\&D: Evidence from firms' patents, profits and market value},
author={Jaffe, Adam B},
year={1986},
publisher={National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA}
abstract={This paper quantifies the effects on the productivity of firms' R&D of exogenous variations in the state of technology (technological opportunity) and of the R&D of other firms (spillovers of R&D). The R&D productivity is increased by the R&D of "technological neighbors," though neighbors' R&D lowers the profits and market value of low-R&D-intensity firms. Firms are shown to adjust the technological composition of their R&D in response to technological opportunity.},
discipline={Econ, Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe (1986) - Technological Opportunity And Spillovers Of R And D.pdf}
}
@techreport{jaffe1998international,
title={International knowledge flows: evidence from patent citations},
author={Jaffe, Adam B and Trajtenberg, Manuel},
year={1998},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}
abstract={This paper explores the patterns of citations among patents taken out by inventors in the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, and Japan. We find (1) patents assigned to the same firm are more likely to cite each other, and come sooner than other citations; (2) patents in the same patent class are approximately 100 times as likely to cite each other as patents from different patent classes, but there is not a strong time pattern to this effect; (3) patents whose inventors reside in the same country are typically 30-80% more likely to cite each other than inventors from other countries, and these citations come sooner; and (4) there are clear country-specific citation tendencies, e.g., Japanese citations typically come sooner than those of other countries.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe Trajtenberg (1998) - International Knowledge Flows Evidence From Patent Citations.pdf},
}
@article{jaffe1993geographic,
title={Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations},
author={Jaffe, Adam B and Trajtenberg, Manuel and Henderson, Rebecca},
journal={the Quarterly journal of Economics},
volume={108},
number={3},
pages={577--598},
year={1993},
abstract={We compare the geographic location of patent citations with that of the cited patents, as evidence of the extent to which knowledge spillovers are geographically localized. We find that citations to domestic patents are more likely to be domestic, and more likely to come from the same state and SMSA as the cited patents, compared with a "control frequency" reflecting the pre-existing concentration of related research activity. These effects are particularly significant at the local (SMSA) level. Localization fades over time, but only very slowly. There is no evidence that more "basic" inventions diffuse more rapidly than others.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Jaffe Trajtenberg Henderson (1993) - Geographic Localization Of Knowledge Spillovers As Evidenced By Patent Citations.pdf}
}
@article{lichtman2006patent,
title={Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process},
author={Lichtman, Douglas},
journal={U Chicago Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper},
number={292},
year={2006}
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Mgmt},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lichtman (2006) - Patent Holdouts And The Standard Setting Process.pdf}
}
@book{merrill2004patent,
title={A patent system for the 21st century},
author={Merrill, Stephen A and Levin, Richard C and Myers, Mark B and others},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Merrill Levin Myers others (2004) - A Patent System For The 21st Century.pdf}
}
@article{smith2004innovation,
title={Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?},
author={Smith, Bradford L and Mann, Susan O},
journal={The University of Chicago Law Review},
pages={241--264},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Smith Mann (2004) - Innovation And Intellectual Property Protection In The Software Industry.pdf}
}
@book{wasserman1994social,
title={Social network analysis: Methods and applications},
author={Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine},
volume={8},
year={1994},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={} ,
filename={Wasserman Faust (1994) - Social Network Analysis Methods And Applications.pdf}
}
Discard From Up Group By Ed (Apr 8th)
@article{carrier2012roadmap,
title={A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing},
author={Carrier, M.},
journal={CPI Antitrust Chronicle},
volume={2},
year={2012},
abstract={The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and wars based on those patents. Every day brings a new lawsuit or development between Apple, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola Mobility (“MMI”), Nokia, and Samsung. The lawsuits span numerous courts and several continents. And they often pit Apple or Microsoft on one side and manufacturers of Google’s Android operating system—HTC, MMI, and Samsung—on the other.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and wars based on those patents.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Private Mechanisms, Industry Commentary, Standards, SSOs, FRAND, SEP, Licensing},
filename={Carrier (2012) - A Roadmap To The Smartphone Patent Wars And Frand Licensing.pdf}
}
@article{gilbert2004antitrust,
title={Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution},
author={Gilbert, R.J.},
journal={Stanford Technology Law Review},
volume={2004},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Equations},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Barrier To Entry},
thicket_def_extract={The court ruled that the contracts that allocated exclusive territories among National Lead and other companies violated the antitrust laws. The court also concluded that the contract between DuPont and National Lead was anticompetitive. The court ruled that the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.},
tags={Private Mechanisms, Balance with Anti-trust, Pools},
filename={Gilbert (2004) - Antitrust For Patent Pools A Century Of Policy Evolution.pdf}
}
