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{{Article
|Has page=Reinganum (1989) - The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion
|Has author=Reinganum
|Has year=1989
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
*This page is referenced in [[PHDBA602 (Innovation Models)]]
 
 
==Reference(s)==
*Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1989), "Chapter 14 The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 849-908. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Reinganum%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%2014%20The%20Timing%20Of%20Innovation%20Research%20Development%20And%20Diffusion.pdf (pdf)]
 
@article{reinganum1989timing,
title={The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion},
author={Reinganum, Jennifer F},
journal={Handbook of industrial organization},
volume={1},
pages={849--908},
year={1989},
publisher={Amsterdam: North Holland}
}
==Abstract==
#'''Dasguspta and Stiglitz (1980)''' gives a first price auction like game, but with a continously discounted prize and bids translate into times to invention.
#'''Kamien and Schwatz (1976)''' describe the partial equilibrium of a patent race with stochastic invention
#'''[[Loury (1979) - Market Structure And Innovation |Loury (1979)]]''' give gives the full equilibrium result #'''[[Lee,Wilde (1980) - Market Structure And Innovation A Reformulation |Lee and Wilde (1980)]]''' extend Loury by considering the payment of cost to occur continously as continous until an invention occurs, rather than solely at the outset
#'''Reinganum (1982)''' gives an even more general model, which allows for variable rates of investment over time (and so full strategic responses to rival's investment), and also considers imperfect patent protection.

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