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And I estimate that the four most cited papers in the third literature (all included in the first group is the 'classics') are:*Arora et al. These are universally referenced (2001)*Gans and Stern (2010)*Lemley and Shapiro (2005)*Lemley and fundamental building blocks.Shapiro (2007)
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Below are the most cited economic papers included in the references of the NPE papers in this review. I have grouped them into three groups. In the first group is the literature that outlines markets for technologies, the existence and characteristics of patent thickets, the suggests that patents are 'probabilistic' (perhaps arising from failures at the patent office). Also included in this group is Josh Lerner's "Trolls on State Street" paper, which was very heavily referenced, and provides the seminal reference for the economic concept of a troll (as far as I can see).
In the second group, is the broader references that back up the first group. The same themes are present, but generally less developed. Also included in this group is some key papers from the patent pools literature and the litigation of patents literature (the economic branch of it anyway). These are two literatures are complementary to the NPE literature, but distinct. They also build of the papers in the first group. And in the third group is the 'classics'. These are universally referenced and fundamental building blocks.
===Market for Technologies, Patent Thickets, and Probabilistic Patents===
*Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., Gambardella, A., 2001. Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
*Arora, A. and M. Ceccagnoli (2006), ‘Patent protection, complementary assets, and firm’s incentives for technology licensing,’ Management Science, 52(2), 293-308.
*Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (2008). "How Strong Are Weak Patents?" American Economic Review, 98:4, pp. 1347-1369.
*Gilbert, R., Shapiro, C., 1990. Optimal patent length and breadth. RAND Journal of Economics 21, 106-112.
*Gans, J.S. and S. Stern (2010) "Is there A Market for Ideas?" Industrial and Corporate Change, 19(3), pp. 805-837.
*Hall, B. and R. Ziedonis (2001), ‘The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995,’ RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), 101-128.
*Lemley, M., 2000. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Berkeley Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series, 19.
*Lemley, M.A. and C. Shapiro (2005) "Probabilistic Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19(2), pp. 75-98.
*Lemley, M., & C. Shapiro. 2007. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking. 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991.
*Lerner, J. (2006): Trolls on State Street? The Litigation of Financial Patents, Working Paper p.1976-2005.
*Merges, R. (2005), ‘A transactional view of property rights,’ Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 20(4), 1477-1520.
*Shapiro, C. (2001) "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," in A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, and S. Stern, eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 1, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 119-150.
*Shapiro, C. (2006), ‘Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties,’ Working paper, http:// faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf (last accessed August 2010).
*Ziedonis, R., 2004. Don’t fence me in: fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms. Management Science 50, 804-820.
===Innovation, Industry Structure, and Patent Scope, Licensing, and Pools===
*Farrell, J., H. Monroe and G. Saloner (1998), ‘The vertical structure of industry: systems competition versus component competition,’ Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 7(2), 143-182.
*Jaffe, A. B. (2000), ‘The U.S. patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation process,’ Research Policy, 29(4), 531-557.
*Jaffe, A. B. and J. Lerner (2004) Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
*Kortum, S., Lerner, J., 1999. What is behind the recent surge in patenting? Research Policy 28 (1), 1-22.
*Lamoreaux, N.R. and Sokoloff, K. L., 1999. Inventive activity and the market for technology in the United States, 1840-1920. NBER Working Paper 7107, National Bureau of Economics Research, Inc, Cambridge, MA.
*Lanjouw, J.O., Lerner, J., 2001. Tilting the table? The predatory use of preliminary injunctions. The Journal of Law and Economics XLTV, 573-603.
*Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2004), "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review 94 (2004), 691-711.
*Lerner, J., M. Strojwas and J. Tirole (2007) "The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules," Rand Journal of Economics 38(3), pp. 610-625.
*Lanjouw, J., & M. Schankerman. 2001. Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition. The RAND Journal of Economics 32(1):129-151.
*Lerner, Josh. "Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors." Journal of Law and Economics 38 (1995).
*Lerner, J., 1994. The importance of patent scope: an empirical analysis. Rand Journal of Economics 25 (2), 319-333.
*Lerner, J. (2002), ‘Where does state street lead? A first look at finance patents, 1971 to 2000,’ The Journal of Finance, 57(2), 901-930.
*Lanjouw, J., Schankerman, M., 1997. Stylized Facts of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership. NBER Working Paper No. 6297.
*Merges, R.P., Nelson, R.R., 1990. On the complex economics of patent scope. Columbia Law Review 90, 839-916.
*Macdonald, S., 2004. When means becomes ends: considering the impact of patent strategy on innovation. Information Economics and Policy 16, 135-158.
*Shapiro, C. (2003) "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements," Rand Journal of Economics 34, 391- 411.
*Schmidt, K. (2006), ‘Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration,’ Working paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract¼944169 (last accessed November 2006).
*Schankerman, M., Scotchmer, S., 2001. Damages and injunctions in the protection of intellectual property. RAND Journal of Economics 32, 199-200.
===Classic Literature===
*Arrow, K.J., 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In: Nelson, R. (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
*Coase, R.H. (1932), The Nature of the Firm, JL Econ. \& Org. Vol. 4, 1988
*Cohen, W.M., Nelson, R.R., Walsh J. P., 2000. Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552, National Bureau of Economics Research, Inc, Cambridge, MA.
*Levin, R.C., A.K. Klevorick, R.R. Nelson, and S.G. Winter. 1987. Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3:783-820.
*Teece, D.J., 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15, 285-305.
*Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261
