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*This page is referenced in [[Entrepreneurship_Research_Boot_Camp#Venture_Capital_Financing | The NBER Entrepreneurship Research Boot Camp Page]]
==Reference(s)==
*Kaplan, Steven, and Per Strömberg (2003), "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: Evidence from Venture Capital Contracts", Review of Economic Studies 70, 281-315. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Kaplan%20Stromberg%20(2003)%20-%20Financial%20Contracting%20Theory%20Meets%20The%20Real%20World%20Evidence%20From%20Venture%20Capital%20Contracts.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
We compare the characteristics of real-world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory. We do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. The distinguishing characteristic of VC financings is that they allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights. We describe and measure these rights.We then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories.We also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights.
Kaplan Stromberg (2003) - Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World Evidence From Venture Capital Contracts (view source)
Revision as of 18:41, 26 June 2011
, 18:41, 26 June 2011New page: *This page is referenced in The NBER Entrepreneurship Research Boot Camp Page ==Reference(s)== *Kaplan, Steven, and P...
*This page is referenced in [[Entrepreneurship_Research_Boot_Camp#Venture_Capital_Financing | The NBER Entrepreneurship Research Boot Camp Page]]
==Reference(s)==
*Kaplan, Steven, and Per Strömberg (2003), "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: Evidence from Venture Capital Contracts", Review of Economic Studies 70, 281-315. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Kaplan%20Stromberg%20(2003)%20-%20Financial%20Contracting%20Theory%20Meets%20The%20Real%20World%20Evidence%20From%20Venture%20Capital%20Contracts.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
We compare the characteristics of real-world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory. We do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. The distinguishing characteristic of VC financings is that they allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights. We describe and measure these rights.We then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories.We also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights.
