Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Holmstrom (1999) - Managerial Incentive Problems (view source)
Revision as of 21:17, 6 April 2010
, 21:17, 6 April 2010→Set-up
The manager will best respond by choice an effort sequence:
<math>\underset{\{a_{t}(y^{t-1})\}_{t=1}^{\infty }}{\max }\;\sum_{t=1}^{\infty}\beta ^{t-1}[Ew_{t}(y^{t-1})-Eg(a_{t}(y^{t-1}))]\,</math>
===Two Period Model===
Wages are paid in advance so in the second period the agent exerts no effort. In equilbrium <math>a_{1}^{*}\,</math> is correctly anticipated.
