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Grossman Helpman (2001) - Special Interest Politics Chapters 4 And 5 (view source)
Revision as of 19:57, 27 April 2010
, 19:57, 27 April 2010no edit summary
#As <math>\delta\,</math> gets smaller, more partitions can be sustained.
#If <math>n\,</math> partitions can be sustained then so can <math>k<n\,</math>.
===Welfare considerations===
More partitions are more informative and yield greater welfare. The equilibrium with the greatest number of partitions is the one preferred by both the SIG and the policymaker.
===Two Lobbies - Like bias===
====Public Meetings====
When information is reported sequentially there can not be full relevation. There can be a partition equilibrium from combining the two reports. The number of partitions can not be greater than the number that would arise from a single lobby with the smaller (more moderate) bias, and so both would agree to allow only this SIG to report. ===Two Lobbies - Opposite Bias=== With two lobbies where <math>\delta_1 < 0\,</math> and <math>\delta_2 > 0 \,</math> the policy maker can use the competition to become more informed, though not fully informed. Crucially, define \theta_2^* \equiv \theta_{max} - \delta_2 It is not possible to reveal the state of the world when \theta > \theta_2^*. See the paper for further information. ===Multi-dimensional Information=== When the groups differ in their relative bias on a single dimension there is full revelation. By choosing new dimensions through the multidimensional space it is possible (given the necessary dimensionality of the choices and alignment conditions) to establish full relevation through-out the space.
