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Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay (view source)
Revision as of 15:58, 15 November 2010
, 15:58, 15 November 2010New page: ==Reference(s)== *Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20F...
==Reference(s)==
*Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
We argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low-cost solutions, these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems, which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both. Consequently, decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information, but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important. We also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge.
*Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
We argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low-cost solutions, these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems, which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both. Consequently, decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information, but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important. We also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge.
