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And so the we have both that (as As <math>\widehat{U_e}^(x) = u_e(x) + u_g(x) + u_h(x) \quad</math>) , the principal's problem is to maximize the joint surplus and that the contribution schedules are truthful.
Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 03:29, 31 October 2009
, 03:29, 31 October 2009→Joint Surplus Maximization
:<math>\therefore u_e(x^*) + u_g^*(x^*) + u_h^*(x^*) \ge u_e(x) + u_g^*(x) + u_h^*(x) \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}</math>
===Solving For Linear Contribution Terms===
