Cabral Hortacsu (2008) - Dynamics Of Seller Reputation
Revision as of 12:05, 29 September 2020 by Maintenance script (talk | contribs)
| Article | |
|---|---|
| Has bibtex key | |
| Has article title | |
| Has year | |
| In journal | |
| In volume | |
| In number | |
| Has pages | |
| Has publisher | |
| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Reference(s)
Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics pdf
Abstract
We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the impor- tance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We find that, when a seller �rst receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the �rst one and don't have nearly as much impact as the first one. We also �nd that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average.
Keywords: quality, reputation, auctions, eBay.
