Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities

Model Setup

2011 2nd Year exam paper question.

• Players: Legislators, vote buyers A and B.
• Choice space: [math](x,s)\in R[/math].
• Preferences: Legislators: [math]u_{i}=u_{i}(x)-u_{i}(s)[/math]
• Game form: A first, b second. Bribe upon commitment to vote.
• Information: Complete/perfect.
• EQM: SPNE, Pure strategies, tie rule: Vote for last offer.
• Because lobbyists are worried about competitors invading coalitions, it is sometimes cheaper to bribe a large majority, possibly including the entire legislature.

Rui's points:

• Sequence matters,
• More than minimum winning coalition
• First mover advantage and 2nd mover advantage.
• "The proofs are horrendous, you don't need to know those."