PTLR Codification
This page is a part of the Patent Thicket Literature Review paper
Webcrawler Wiki: PTLR Webcrawler
Contents
The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them. See below:
Core Terms
Saturated Invention Spaces - (SIS)
As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15) Example of: imperfect competition Look for: cluster coherent groups adjacent saturated substitutes complements free-ride invent around imperfect competition substitutes Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006
Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)
1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro, pg.17) Example of: lack of coordination of licensing prices Look for: diversely-held complementary inputs multiple inputs dispersed anticommons tragedy of the anticommons fragmented Cournot problem multiple marginalization FRAND patent pools licensing cross-licensing license standard setting SSO royalty stacking multilateral arrangements bilateral arrangements individual arrangements invent around Mexican Standoff Coasian Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley & Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969
Overlapping Patents - (OP)
Second most common foundation of a thicket. Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights. Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap. Example of: Imperfectly defined property rights' Look for: patent overlap overlap overlapping claims similar claims simultaneous infringement Frequent Author(s): Burk & Lemley 2003, Regibeau & Rockett 2011
Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)
Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents. Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors. Example of: Moral Hazard Look for: spurious patents dubious bad likely invalid junk impeding genuine innovators rent-seeking bad faith submarines ever-greening hidden action Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld & Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe & Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004
Modern Terms
Transaction Costs - (TC)
All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance. Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms. Look for: prosecution costs court fees bargaining costs coordinating costs maintenance fees licensing fees Coasian Coase Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn & MacGarvie 2009/2011
Probabilistic Patents - (PP)
Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art. Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation. They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents. Look for: imperfectly defined property rights probabilistic uncertain infringement Frequent Author(s): Lemley & Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003
Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)
Patents issued for reason/utility unknown. Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value. Look for: ever-greening submarine patents viagra expected returns commercialization opportunities spurious patents gaming the patent system patent portfolios stand-alone commercial value Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob
Search Costs - (SC)
All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty. This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities. Look for: transaction costs fees Coase Coasian Leahy-Smith Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn & MacGarvie 2011
Patent Hold-up - (PH)
The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology. Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower. This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee. Look for: hold-up Williamson's FRAND SEP license fee guile Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC
Strategic Patents - (SP)
Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom. In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value. Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs. Look for accumulating patents patent portfolio Frequent Author(s): Hall & Ziedonis
Hold-out - (HO)
Can occur in situations of DHCI when a "hold-out" player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties. The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned. *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners. Look for: hold-out multilateral bargaining non-participating Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009
Additional Terms found by Dylan
Look for: patent strategies IP rights thicket patent thicket TRIPS Diffusion of Innovation overlapping ownership multiple overlapping granted patent rights non-practicing entity patent pile-up cross license patent pool follow-on inventions complimentary input anti-commons Cournot problem simultaneous infringment Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Mexican Standoff standardization game theory battle of the sexes hand-cuffing build-and-let-build modern standards technical standards international standards exclusively licensed
Types
Theory - (T)
Empirical - (E)
Discussion - (D)
Topics
Effects on Academia - (EA)
Look for: cumulative innovation basic science research development
Private Mechanism - (PM)
Look for: cross-licensing patent pools patent clearinghouses patent collectives FRAND patent intermediaries NPEs technology standards standard setting organizations patent clearinghouses
Industry Commentary - (IC)
Look for: nanotech industry genetics industry basic science upstream patents nanobiotech synthetic biology
IPR Reform - (IPR)
Look for: property rights USPTO propertization IP rights patent pools Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
Firm Strategy - (FS)
Look for: market entry compete invent around infringement blocking secrecy ever-greening Mexican Standoff patent troll saturated invention space
Publication Type
Econ - (ECON) Law - (LAW) Science - (SCI) Policy Report - (POLR)
Authors
What are the number of authors? (0-9) How many authors are repeat authors?
Individual Terms
Code for: cross-licensing patent pools patent clearinghouses patent collectives FRAND / RAND patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.) NPEs Non-Participating Entities technology standards SSOs (standard setting organizations) patent trolls submarine patents SEPs (Standard Essential Patents) ever-greening blocking cites: Shapiro (2001), "Navigating the patent thicket" cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), "Anti-commons something..." cites: Heller (1997?), "Something..."
