Changes

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Single Firm, Strategic ValuePatenting (Good), Barrier To Entry},

thicket_stance_extract={In other words, many closely related patents may cover a single product, mak- ing it much more difficult for competitors to invent noninfringing substitutes. Patent thickets increase the probability of “hold"hold-up” up" licensing, that is, exercising the ability to charge a premium for patent licenses in the case of technologies in which competitors have already invested heavily. Id. A patent thicket is just one instance of portfolio value, because a group of patents on related technologies can have a value greater than the sum of its parts even if the patents do not create overlapping rights in the same product. Regardless of the particular manifestation of portfolio value, previous research has not cap- tured this aspect of patent value, and we have not ascertained a way to estimate the effect of a patent’s contribution to a portfolio apart from whatever stand-alone value it may or may not have.}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Overlapping Patents, Hold-up, Strategic Patenting (Good), Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={Portfolio value can manifest itself in licensing negotiations, especially cross-licensing, or merely in the greater in terrorem effects it creates for competitors... Carl Shapiro has called “a "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”"},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-held Held, Complementary Inputs, Strategic ValueAlways Hinders Innovation},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001) that can increase costs for downstream activities such as cumulative innovation and the development of new products that combine multiple existing innovations.}, tags={Private Mechanisms, Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses... The more the existing IP rights that cover a given downstream activity, the higher will be the transaction costs associated with licensing. In addition, if the upstream IP rights are complementary, potential coordination failures among IP owners can lead to excessively high licensing fees.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Broad Patents, Single Firm, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Always Hinders Innovation, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={However, there is no clear distinction between the use of patents to prevent copying and the use of patents to block competitors. The function of blocking is to create a wide space around an innovation where other firms cannot develop a competitive alternative.... One of the worst-case outcomes of the patenting strategies of private firms is the creation of an ‘anti-commons’ in which the necessary knowledge to conduct further research is covered by a large number of patents held by a large number of firms. This has been called a patent thicket, or a “dense "dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” technology" (Shapiro, in press).Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raise the concern that licensing in some areas, such as biotechnology, could become so complex or expensive that it acts as a drag on the rate and direction of research, thereby slowing down the development of socially beneficial products and processes... Patent thickets that develop through both defensive and offensive patent strategies could increase the transaction costs for arranging licenses. The cost of complex licensing arrangements could raise business costs without any benefits to the firms involved, with costs passed on to consumers.},

thicket_def={Based on InfringementDubious Patents, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={Obviously, the more patents, the more inventors must spend on patent management, licensing and litigation. At some point the mounting costs must dissuade inventors with shallow pockets... so that [R\&D] accretes in major pharmaceutical companies, ahead of small biotechnology firms... Correa is correct that the quality of patent examination is scandalous. Even in Europe or North America, many dubious patents are issued. The resulting lack of legal certainty harms everyone: competitors who must spend heavily to overturn wronly granted patents; consumers who pay a premium while those patents remain in force; and even companies and their shareholders, as happened when an invalid Prozac patent was finally overtruned, wiping US $35 billion off Feli Lilly's market capitalization.},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping PatentsComplementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},

thicket_def={Multiple Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI)}, thicket_def_extract={The creator of this term defines the patent thicket as « "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. » " (Shapiro, 2001)... The patent thicket describes a situation in which holders of different patents that are all necessary for complying with a standard mutually block each other in the implementation of the standard. Another advantage of pools highlighted by the economic literature is to reduce the transaction costs by cutting down the number of licenses needed by firms without patents who wish to produce products that comply with the standard. The last advantage of patent pools is to reduce the multiple marginalization problem6. This problem arises if different firms have market power over complementary inputs, such as different patents necessary for complying with the same standard, and fix prices independently of each other.},

thicket_stance_extract={Policy makers and industry participants have come to take a positive stance on patent pools, as pools play an important role in leveling the playing field for competition on the downstream production market, reducing transaction costs and encouraging the spread of innovative technology throughout the industry. In view of these benefits, patent pools are seen as indispensable instruments in cutting through the patent thickets in ICT. Indeed, by clearing blocking positions and facilitating access to the technology, patent pools help attenuating the negative downstream effects of patent thickets. On the other hand, as our analysis has pointed out, there is a risk that these positive downstream effects are offset by the fact that patent pools create incentives to exacerbate some of the worrying upstream effects of patent thickets. Indeed, one of the harmful effects of patent thickets is to induce socially wasteful excess investment in patent races and opportunistic patent files, deviating resources away from innovation to rent seeking strategies...}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Transaction Costs, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Patent pools are seen as a potential solution to inefficiencies resulting from dense “thickets” "thickets" of overlapping patents (Shapiro, 2001). From an optimistic point of view, the positive effect of patent pools on the number of patent declarations would indicate that patent pools are efficient in mitigating the adverse effects of patent thickets on innovation and induce supplementary innovation efforts... Indeed, by clearing blocking positions and facilitating access to the technology, patent pools help attenuating the negative downstream effects of patent thickets....},

thicket_def={Multiple Broad Patents, Overlapping Blocking Patents, Broad PatentsDiversely-Held, Single Firm},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Barrier To Entry, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Strategic Patenting (Good)}, thicket_def_extract={Some of the most important new issues are raised by the "defensive" use of intellectual property rights among oligopolists.... In semiconductors, and probably many other industries, there is a small number of oligopolists, probably small enough to provide the basis for a significant oligopoly rent due to parallel pricing above the competitive level. (Unless there is some form of quasi-rent or return greater than marginal cost, there will be no incentive for invest- ment in research.4) Each of the oligopolists holds a substantial patent portfolio, significant components of which are infringed by each of its competitors. Although litigation is possible, it is rare, because of the fear that any suit will be met by a counter suit. This fear may lead to a tacit cross-license of the patent portfolios; in some cases the cross-license may be explicit. Although this situation raises other antitrust issues to be discussed in this article, the most serious one arises from the possibility that the oligopolists will exercise their intellectual property rights to prevent entry into the oligopol},

thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Mutliple Overlapping PatentsDiversely-Held},

thicket_def={Multiple References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Always Hinders Innovation, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Broad Patents, Broad Dubious Patents, References ShapiroOverlapping Patents, Quotes ShapiroSingle Firm}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as “a "a ‘dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.’” ’" Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Patent Cross-Licensing in the Computer and Software Industry, 233 N.Y. L. J., Jan. 11, 2005, at 3, 6 (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Settings, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)). Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation and “"[c]laims in such patent thickets have been characterized as ‘often broad, overlapping and conflicting . . . ’”’"). },

thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, Multiple Always Hinders Innovation, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Broad Overlapping Patents, Single Firm, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology". Such patent thickets, as a result of multiple blocking patents, are considered to discourage and stifle innovation. Claims in such patent thickets have been characterized as boften broad, overlapping and conflicting — - a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...},

thicket_def={References Refernces Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Multiple Always Hinders Innovation, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Broad Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Hold-up, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Multiple Overlapping PatentsHeld},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Transaction Costs, Multiple Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Diversely-Held},

abstract={Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product’s technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build “thickets” of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of “mutual "mutual non-aggression.” " Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimal.},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={The problem Baker describes is often called a “patent "patent thicket.” " These occur when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for a review). When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), “holdup"holdup,” " and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).},

thicket_def={Multiple References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism (Not DHCI), Strategic Patenting (Bad), References ShapiroBarrier To Entry},

tags={Private Mechanisms, Firm Strategy, Blocking Patents, Licensing, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Value from Position/Portfolio},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Broad Patents, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Dubious Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Blocking PatentsComplementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Hold-up, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={This network is defined a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001). A patent thicket consists of a number of adjacent and overlapping property rights, which impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to ask for licenses from several patent holders... Obviously, this frequently results in high monetary and transaction costs... The nature of transaction costs previously mentioned can be traced back to two fundamental determinants: the problem of complementary input and the problem of hold-up.... There is a second aspect which deserves attention, regarding the already cited hold-up problem. This problem is strictly linked to the level of difficulty with which during the downstream stages from the innovative chain, it is possible to put into action inventing around strategies...},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Hold-up, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has defined a patent thicket as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."20 3 Patent thickets have been associated most frequently with the semiconductor industry, but they also have been observed in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries... The existence of a patent thicket increases the power of each patentholder with a patented part in the product, because each can block the use of the product by all others. The power is magnified by the patent system, with its use of injunctions and costly and lengthy infringement litigation. 20 5 The dangers of the patent thicket are exacerbated when patents are issued for products that already are on the market.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism (Not DHCI)},

thicket_def={DiverselyUnspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Hold-held Complementary Inputsup}, thicket_def_extract={Mark Lemley has shown that SSOs have concentrated “in precisely those industries where the unconstrained enforcement of patents could be most damaging to innovation,” namely, computer software, Internet, telecommunications, and semiconductors.89 In these industries, the presence of multiple patented inputs in products increases the risk of holdup. Just as ominous, the industries are marked by “cumulative innovation,” with one generation’s patented invention based on those of previous generations.90... In these industries, the presence of multiple patented inputs in products increases the risk of holdup. Just as ominous, the industries are marked by “cumulative innovation,” with one generation’s patented invention based on those of previous generations.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Dubious Patents}, thicket_def_extract={The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003). With the ex parte relationships between patent applicants and examiners and with no adversary to aid examiners either in identifying the relevant prior art or in evaluating the applicants' claims, the task of weeding out patents of questionable quality or even trivial significance is (in the current U.S. system) left to litigation in the courts.},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={Though ...innovation is cumulative, the assertion of patents on key upstream discoveries may significantly restrict follow-on research.14 The patenting of numerous, individually less significant discoveries may also impede academic research. Although their focus is largely on commercial projects, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Shapiro (2000) suggest that the patenting of a broad range of research tools that researchers need to do their work has spawned "patent thickets" that may make the acquisition of licenses and other rights too burdensome to permit the pursuit of what should otherwise be scientifically and socially worthwhile research,(engendering a tragedy of the "anticommons" [Heller and Eisenberg 1998]).},

thicket_def={Broad Patents, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Barrier To Entry, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={In particular, originator companies confirm that they aim to develop strategies to extend the breadth and duration of their patent protection. One commonly applied strategy is filing numerous patents for the same medicine (forming so called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets"). Documents gathered in the course of the inquiry confirm that an important objective of this strategy is to delay or block the market entry of generic medicines.}, tags={Industry Commentary, Firm Strategy, Defensive/Ofefnsive Offensive Patents, Blocking Patents},

thicket_def={DiverselyOverlapping Patents, Single Firm, Hold-held Compelmentary Inputsup, Strategic ValueBarrier To Entry}, thicket_def_extract={Here, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely explained not by a firms’ drive to innovate more than before, but by a need to accumulate large enough “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind of defensive manoeuvre.For instance, take the situation where company A fears that its products will infringe one or more patents owned by company B. So, by developing and holding a large enough patent thicket company A makes sure that company B will inevitably infringe one of these thicketed patents. As a result, negotiations will follow in order to avoid court action between them, and likely end up with mutual cross-licensing between companies A and B Defensive and strategic patenting has for instance, in some sectors resulted in patent thickets, the consequences of which are generally undesirable in terms of creating too many, possibly overlapping patents, which can crowd a technological field and make it difficult and costly to navigate through.... making it difficult for new and small inventors to enter the market.},

thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary InputsBroad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Single Firm}, thicket_def_extract={When multiple organisations each own individual patents that are collectively necessary for a particular technology, their competing intellectual property rights form a "patent thicket"... However, if this does not happen, nanotechnology research is bound to get stifled in an atmosphere of fragmented intellectual property and broad overlapping claims, [FN30] although licencing also carries with it the problem of protracted negotiations, delays, high royalties and other transaction costs. In most cases this will deter many smaller startups and research centres from attempting to traverse the patent thicket. Also broad, overlapping and conflicting thickets are likely to lead to lengthy and costly patent battles... company that finds itself enmeshed in a patent thicket has a number of options. It can either sue anyone it finds that may be potentially infringing its patent or attempt to commercialise its patent and risk being sued in return.},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Hold-up}, thicket_def_extract={...Property rights advocates further note that such fears such as irrational hold-out?most often voiced in the con text of patent thickets and experimental use?are not supported by empirical evidence.3... More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy... Most paradigmatically, inadvertent trespass onto another's land?coupled with sunk investment and nebulous boundaries?may lead to the imposition of a liability rule and the loss of a right to injunctive relief for the property owner. Sound reasoning underlies this element of the law, and it would seem no less applicable to the world of IP. Where an infringer has conducted a meaningful search, where the omitted patent, which is neither licensed nor marketed, is lost amongst thousands in an impenetrable thicket, and where the patent's indeter minate claims?even had they been discovered?would have lead a potential infringer to conclude as a matter of probability that its planned activity is non infringing, analogy to the law of real property would similarly suggest the im plementation of a liability rule. Allowing a non-practicing patentee to enjoin the activity of an innocent infringer following massive investment by the latter creates perverse incentives, inefficiencies, and wealth transfers of questionable desirability.},

thicket_def={Multiple Broad Patents, Overlapping Blocking Patents, Based on Infringement, Broad PatentsSingle Firm},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Multiple Blocking PatentsDiversely-Held},

thicket_def={Overlapping Patents, Single Firm}, thicket_def_extract={Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence of a patent thicket.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Based on InfringementOverlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={This tends to create a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology"... Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. Much of this thicket of overlapping patent rights results from the nature of the technology;... Moreover, as more and more patents issue on incremental inventions, firms seek more and more patents to have enough bargaining chips to obtain access to others’ overlapping patents.21... In the context of a patent thicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning. Questionable patents in patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because a manufacturer needs a license to all of the patents that cover its product, firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to threaten litigation...},

thicket_stance_extract={Overcompensation of certain patented technologies over-incentivizes invention in that area, to the detriment of more productive innovative activity. It also over-incentivizes the pursuit of patents for their own sake, unnecessarily increasing the number of patents in a given field beyond what is necessary to encourage productive innovation. Large numbers of patents can create “patent thickets”35 and increase transaction costs for manufacturers that seek to clear the rights needed to produce a product.}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={One commentator explains that this strategy usually involves acquiring a large quantity of often low quality patents, meaning those that are vague, likely invalid, or that provide narrow coverage of a feature having little commercial value.2 Indeed, IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” – densely overlapping patent rights held by multiple patent owners...Large numbers of patents can create “patent thickets”35 and increase transaction costs for manufacturers that seek to clear the rights needed to produce a product.36},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={Finally, any anticompetitive effects of the open source behavior would be outweighed by the procompetitive effects of reducing patent thickets and promoting the creation and dissemination of ideas without a short-term restriction of supply.... Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Most scholars and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the patent rights, inventing around the rights, and using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that patent holders passively acquiesce... In areas not plagued by patent thickets, basic research tools may be controlled by one entity or a small group of entities},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Always Hinders Innovation},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Diversely-Held, Hold-up},

abstract={Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents as having procompetitive benefits in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of legal suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream input markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents and, if they do, the implications for competition policy to constrain them. Special attention is given to the application of the U.S. Department of Justice‐Federal Justice-Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) to recent patent pool cases.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Royalty Stacking, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={To avoid legal suits, developers of these products entangled in a “patent thicket” 2 have had to negotiate with multiple patent owners, stacking up royalty obligations in the process, or abandon R&D on the innovation altogether... A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to bring a new product or technology to market (Shapiro, 2001)},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Barrier To Entry},

thicket_stance_extract={The strength of the anti‐commons anti-commons thesis rests on two assumptions that are very difficult to test: (1) that developing commercial biomedical products requires access to many different IP rights and (2) that negotiating access with different patent owners is prohibitively difficult and costly. On the first point, the number of biotechnology patents has certainly increased dramatically over the last decade, although by itself that does not necessarily imply greater fragmentation. Walsh et al. (2003) report from interviews with biotechnology industry IP practitioners that preliminary freedom to operate searches can sometimes find hundreds of patents relevant to a candidate product but that on closer inspection “there may be, in a complicated case, about 6‐12 6-12 that they have to seriously address, but that more typically the number was zero.” Enough anecdotal evidence exists, however, to suggest that the fragmentation of rights in biotechnology is sometimes a serious concern.}, thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary InputsSingle Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Medimmune has recently acquired exclusive licenses from the portfolios of Wisconsin, St. Jude, and Mount Sinai School of Medicine (“Technology for Faster, Safer Development of Pandemic Flu Vaccine Licensed by Mount School of Medicine” 2005; “MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine” 2005). The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights and uncertainty about technology ownership... The option of a patent pool for this technology was raised (Fedson 04), but instead the situation was resolved by one patent owner acquiring exclusive licenses from the other ones},

thicket_def={Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Barrier To Entry}, thicket_def_extract={The court ruled that the contracts that allocated exclusive territories among National Lead and other companies violated the antitrust laws. The court also concluded that the contract between DuPont and National Lead was anticompetitive. The court ruled that the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-held , Complementary Inputs, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry... CIRM and other stem cell funders can become catalysts for cutting through this patent thicket. They can require that all grant recipients agree to donate the exclusive license to any insights, materials, and technologies that they patent to a common patent pool supervised by a new, nonprofi t organization...},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Strategic Value, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs}, thicket_def_extract={During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, a number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the difficulty of negotiating the patent thicket in their area and the risk of being “held-up” ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their product. “My observation is that patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco. …….. Everything we have done to create new products would have been done even if we could not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these products. …..The only practical response to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is to file hundreds of patents each year ourselves, so that we can have something to bring to the table in cross-licensing negotiations. ….},

thicket_def={Overlapping Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism, Barrier To Entry, Single Firm}, thicket_def_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, firms often attempt to create a ‘patent thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a host of related products or processes... The creation of a patent thicket of sleeping patents by an incumbent firm with monopoly power is a strategy referred to as ‘preemptive patenting.’ And, as noted by Shapiro [25], given cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation. According to Gilbert and Newbery [26], such a firm has an incentive to maintain its monopoly power by patenting new technologies before potential competitors. The monopoly firm will preempt if the cost is less than the profits gained by preventing entry},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Various commentators have proposed that a proliferation of patents poses a serious threat to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicket, sometimes referred to as a “patent anticommons.”106 The theory is especially associated with articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in 1998, and Eisenberg and Rai in 2002.107... These commentators predict that the patenting of upstream technology will result in a difficult-to-penetrate thicket of patent rights that will severely impede biomedical research and development.110 The idea has found resonance with many, and its influence is evident in a variety of critiques of the current patent system.111 If in fact a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and development, one might expect that organizations representing the interests of biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms}, tags={IPR Reform, Renewal, Stricter Patenting Requirements},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Upstream patents have been criticized on a number of counts. For example, it has been proposed that the proliferation of patents covering research tools has resulted in a “patent thicket,” rendering it virtually impossible to conduct biomedical research without inadvertently infringing upon a host of conflicting patent claims (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg, 2002)... Although in theory a researcher should be able to license the necessary technology inputs, in practice it is generally not feasible owing to the large number of different patent holders, each with their own licensing agenda.},

thicket_def={References Heller/EisenebergEisenberg, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Some have postulated that a “thicket” "thicket" of patents will impede basic biomedical research and will stifle development and utilization of technologies that involve the use of multiple genetic sequences; DNA microarrays are a prime example (5, 6)},

@article{holman2012debunking, title={Debunking the Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents}, author={Holman, C.M.}, journal={Nature Biotechnology}, volume={30}, number={3}, pages={240--244}, year={2012}, publisher={Nature Publishing Group}, abstract={The fear that human gene patents pose a threat to whole-genome sequencing is based largely on widely held misconceptions.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Commentary, Discussion}, industry={Biology, Genetics}, thicket_stance={Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={There is also good reason to think that even the claims most likely to be infringed, reciting short fragments of genomic DNA, or broadly defined methods of testing for genetic variation, would not necessarily be infringed by all forms of WGS, particularly next-generation technologies that do not amplify genes. A company that provides WGS services, but that leaves the job of analyzing the sequence data for clinically important variations to others, would be particularly unlikely to be found liable for infringing any of these gene patents.}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Industry Commentary}, filename={Holman (2012) - Debunking The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene Patents.pdf} }  @article{horn2003alternative, title={Alternative Approaches to IP management: One-stop Technology Platform Licensing}, author={Horn, L.}, journal={Journal of commercial biotechnology}, volume={9},

thicket_stance_extract={In addition, there has been enormous growth in the number of issued patents containing progressively narrower claims. Therefore, licences under multiple patents owned by multiple patent owners are required. In the absence of a patent pool, the transaction costs required to identify the blocking patents and conclude negotiations for a licence under each of them (assuming the patent owners are even willing to enter into licence negotiations), to say nothing of paying multiple royalties, are too costly for the average user – - with the result that technological advancement, adoption and use are impeded; freedom of technological movement is restricted; the potential for conflict is increased; and traditional one-on-one licensing arrangements fall short.}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Transaction Costs},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={A further development is that patents gained in value by their ability to be linked with other patents, which encourages patenting of marginal inventions. The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surge.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI)},

thicket_def={Single Firm, Evergreening}, thicket_def_extract={Every patentee of a major invention is likely to come up with improvements and alleged improvements to his invention. By the time his main patent has expired there will be a thicket of patents intended to extend his monopoly.},

thicket_def={Strategic Value, Multiple Overlapping Broad Patents, Dubious Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Complementary Inputs},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Overlapping Patents, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-held Complementary InputsHeld, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={The proliferation of fragmented and overlapping patent rights is increasingly being recognized as a serious problem; referred to as a "patent thicket" (or "anticommons" by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional transaction costs incurred in navigating a patent thicket, Shapiro (2001) has called attention to another source of inefficiency – : the complements problem. When distinct firms are selling inputs – - all of which are required for production of the final product – - they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate.},

thicket_stance_extract={All three developments have led to what is perceived as a marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping "patent thicket" -overlapping sets of patent rights leading to a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Hold-up}, thicket_def_extract={All three developments have led to what is perceived as a marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping "patent thicket" - overlapping sets of patent rights leading to a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Hold-up, Complementary Inputs}, thicket_def_extract={A growing number of studies have emphasized the negative effect of the hold-up problem when firms compete for a portfolio of complementary patents, called apatent a patent thicket (e.g., Bessen 2004, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Shapiro 2001).},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Almost one hundred years later, patent pools have re-emerged as a remedy for industries that are plagued by litigation and patent blocking, which occurs when owners of competing patents prevent the commercialization of new technologies... Specifically, the prospect of a patent pool increases firms’ incentives to invest in R&D because lower risks of litigation and improved licensing schemes increase expected profits for participating firms...},

thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro, Dubious Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Barrier To Entry, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Our findings that patent portfolio size and technology concentration significantly affect litigation risk have important implications for R&D incentives. The threat of costly enforcement can affect R&D investment and patenting strategies.45 This is especially so for small, high-technology firms that are more likely to face capital market constraints.46 Carl Shapiro emphasizes that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing arrangements and patent pools as a way of mitigating these problems of the anticommons (fragmented property rights).47 But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Until recently, the economic literature on patents pools–voluntary pools - voluntary organizations created for the purpose of pooling a group of patents into a single licensing package–has package - has been quite sparse. Following on the heels of the intense interest in the theories of “patent thickets” "patent thickets" and “royalty stacking” "royalty stacking" (e.g., Shapiro, 2001, 2006), and the increased proliferation of organizations that promulgate technical standards for products and services, patent pools are emerging as an important topic for economic analysis. The newfound interest is understandable, given that patent pools are one of the more readily available tools proposed for overcoming the potentially harmful effects of overlapping or blocking patent rights (Merges, 1999; Shapiro, 2001).},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg},

thicket_def={Blocking Overlapping Quotes Shapiro, Single Firm, Dubious Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Single company acquisition of a dense web of overlapping patents-patent thickets 15-may create a seemingly impenetrable web which a company must hack its way through in order to commercialize new technology... As the number of issued patents skyrocket, companies more frequently enter into arrangements with competitors "not only to recover their investment from creating patented products but also to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of innovation."17 Companies strategically use patent litigation as a means to protect their competitive position. 18 Even though a company might believe that it is not infringing, it is often better to settle than fight... Proctor & Gamble, Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 406, 414 (D. Del. 1998). The term "patent thicket" first appeared in this case. Id at 414, n.6.... As stated above, patent thickets may encompass patents of dubious merit.143 Unfortunately, it is costly to innovate around assertions of infringement.1},

thicket_stance_extract={They are often viewed as the “simplest solution” "simplest solution" to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a patent thickets) or are uncertain if there is possible infringement of patent issues (a.k.a. Patent Hold-Up).}, thicket_def={Overlapping Patents, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Multiple Overlapping PatentsHeld},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={This question has been of particular concern for the biological sciences, where production and exchange of biological ‘research tools’ are important for ongoing scientific progress. Recent studies addressing this issue in the United States1,2, Germany3, Australia4 and Japan5 find that “patent thickets”6 or an “anticommons”7 rarely affect the research of academic scientists... Our respondents do not encounter an anticommons or a patent thicket. Rather, they believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put sand in the wheels of a lively system of intradisciplinary exchanges of research tools. Seeing no countervailing effect on the supply of these tools, they conclude that patenting impedes the progress of research.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller and /Eisenberg(1998), Multiple Overlapping PatentsComplementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Multiple Overlapping PatentsDiversely-Held},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents}, thicket_def_extract={While universities have no direct incentive to restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the optimal implementation of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk... In a surprising range of fields of invention over the past century in what we might think of as "enabling" technologies24 - computer hardware, software, the Internet, even biotechnology - the basic building blocks of the field were either unpatented, through mistake or because they were created by government or university scientists with no interest in patents, or the patents presented no obstacle because the government compelled licensing of the patents, or they were ultimately invalidated. In still other fields, including the laser, the integrated circuit, and polymer chemistry, basic building-block patents did issue, but they were delayed so long in interference proceedings that the industry developed in the absence of enforceable patents... These facts in combination mean that patents will cast a larger shadow over nanotech than they have over any other modern science at a comparable stage of development. Indeed, not since the birth of the airplane a hundred years ago have we seen similar efforts by a range of different inventors to patent basic concepts in advance of a developed market for end products.76 Some fear that ownership of nanotechnology patents is too fragmented, risking the development of a patent "thicket."77 Miller offers several examples of nanoscale technologies that have overlapping patents covering the same basic invention, including the carbon nanotube and semiconducting nanocrystals.},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Fees or Royalties},

thicket_def={Multiple Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Second, open source avoids the problem of a 30 “patent thicket” when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property rights, and at least one party attempts to extract a high fee for its particular contribution... A more benign alternative is that firms enter into patent pools to solve the “patent thicket” problem: the presence of overlapping intellectual property holdings that make it difficult for third parties to license patent holdings and develop new technologies.},

thicket_stance_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result “patent ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.}, thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary InputsHeld, Overlapping Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result “patent ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.},

thicket_def={Diversely-Held Inputs, Royalty Stacking, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={Many observers have suggested that patent-thicket problems - where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries... Patent thickets may lead to three prob lems. First, royalty stacking may result: each individual patent holder may charge a royalty that seems reasonable when viewed in isolation, but together they represent an unreasonable burden. Second, even if other firms agree to license their patents at a modest rate, a hold-out problem may result if a single firm then sets a high license fee for its tech nology Finally, the very process of arranging the needed licenses may prove to be time consuming. Patent pools thus offer a one-stop shop through which these problems can be avoided. B},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Hold-up},

thicket_stance_extract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” "patent thicket" effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies.}, thicket_def={Referencess References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping PatentsComplementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” "patent thicket" effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies.},

thicket_def={Referencess References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Strategic Value},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents},

thicket_def={Single Firm, Evergreening, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Originators fi le numerous follow-on patent applications covering a drug in the hope that at least one of them will be granted and survive a litigation challenge. The consequence of this is often an extensive thicket or cloud of patents around a drug, the various parts of that cloud each typically... A good example of both an improperly granted follow-on patent and a patent thicket is found in relation to the product perindopril erbumine, discussed in Annex A.},

abstract={The patent system was initially designed to provide incentives to develop stand-alone innovations in fi…elds fi?elds such as mechanics, chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Its application is therefore problematical in more recent …elds ?elds such as biotechnology and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are different. A well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. Patent law must then trade off the rights granted to upstream patent owners with the incentives to develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innovations, which are the focus of the paper. When …final ?final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In biotechnology, this is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests that require the use of multiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where …firms ?firms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001). Shapiro (2001) reports, for example, that in the semi-conductor industry …rms ?rms receive “thousands ?thousands of patents each year and manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a single product". The situation is similar in the U.S. software industry, where there are “potentially ?potentially dozens or hundreds of patents covering individual components of a product”product?(FTC, 2003). I study the problem of the production of complementary innovations in a model of dynamic R&D competition between two …firms?firms, and argue that in some cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complementary innovations and examine whether they should be patented separately or as a bundle. This approach echoes several papers on cumulative innovations where patentability requirements are de…ned de?ned as the need to develop two or more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Hunt, 1995; O’DonoghueO?Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends on a trade-off between the pro…fit pro?fit loss due to scattered complementary patents, and the possible bene…fit bene?fit of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts that prices do not maximize the …rms’pro…ts ?rms?pro?ts (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to patenting can be a way to prevent this pro…t pro?t loss. However, small innovations are not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (Scotchmer and Green, 1990). As a result, …firms ?firms lose the possibility to quit the race after a …first ?first innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications. I show that patent disclosure has a positive social effect, although it does not permit a fully effi cient coordination between …firms?firms. In this context, bundling innovations prior to patenting can be more effi cient if innovations can be devel- oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent with the legal de…nition de?nition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement. The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented separately, while Section 4 focuses on the case in which they must be bundled prior to patenting. Section 5 compares the social outcomes of the two require- ments. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the model.},

thicket_stance_extract={The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent (Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003)... When …final ?final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001)}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Dubious Patents}, thicket_def_extract={It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where …rms firms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001)...The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complemen- tary innovations are frequent..},

thicket_def={Complementary Inputs, Diversely-held Complementary InputsHeld},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Unenforced Dubious Patents},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Overlapping PatentsDiversely-Held},

thicket_def={Multiple PatentsComplementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Managing the patent thicket in the fields of vaccine technology is challenging as one product may be covered by a plurality of exclusive IP rights that have to be considered when developing a product and building up a patent portfolio.. Consequently, licensing is a key point in the vaccine industry. If a basic patent is held by a powerful patent holder refusing to grant a license under reasonable commercial terms or abuses a market-dominating position, it should be examined, whether the requirements to request a compulsory license are fulfilled.},

thicket_def={Multiple Blocking PatentsReferences Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},

thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern, however, has created what some would characterize as a “Patent Thicket” 59 Thicket”59 in biotechnology. That is, emerging from the overabundance of patent filings and associated activity is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights”rights”60 that requires those seeking to commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.61 Pharmaceutical companies typically grow a patent thicket seeking a wide range of chemical variants and analogs, methods of synthesizing the drug, chemical intermediates in this synthesis, different crystal forms, different finished dosage forms and various methods of use.62 Obtaining permission from various patent holders for use of patents can prove to be difficult particularly if the patent holder’s objective in creating the thicket is to block innovation by outsiders. Because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies, we could conceivably witness cumulative innovation with infringement on many patents which ultimately serves as a drag on innovation and commercialization.},

thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={In some industries, particularly the semiconductor industry, access to hundreds of patents may be necessary in order to produce a single commercial product. Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.””3 It is hypothesized that patent thickets increase transactional costs and stifle innovation by making it more expensive and difficult to bring new developments to the market... the ability to bring a product to market in the presence of a patent thicket and the stacking royalties must separately be addressed... Closely related is the concept of patent thickets. A single product may include many different, individually patented components.... The patent thicket is best understood in the semiconductor industry where any given microchip may infringe a number of patents, including the process manufacturing patents used to produce the chip. Here, patents are complementary because different inventors independently have patented different components of the larger invention. This is unlike blocking patents (otherwise referred to as improvement patents) resulting from the incremental process of innovation.},

thicket_def={Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={Second, our notion of a correct decision rests on the legal meaning of validity (that is, novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness). From an economic perspective, however, whether an invention should be patentable depends on the relative net change to the incentive to invent and innovate and the size of the deadweight monopoly losses. The latter includes strategic ways to construct undesirable patent thickets, build patent portfolios to extract additional bargaining power in cross-licensing arrangements, or other rent-seeking activities.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Patents, Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism (Not DHCI), Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees... If you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, "you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation."... indicating that many patents have been filed relating to nanomaterials with their claims overlapping... Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents.},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Multiple overlapping patentsTransaction Costs, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Defensive patenting has become particularly prominent in certain industries like the semiconductor industry, where innovation is cumulative, and a thicket of relevant patents often exists.... Moreover, the guidelines on utility incorporate, at least implicitly, economic concerns that setting the utility standard too low could impede scientific progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy thicket of patents on basic research},

thicket_def={Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Strategic Value, Blocking PatentsPatenting (Good)}, thicket_def_extract={Multivariate analysis of the data suggests that in selected discrete technologies, patent ‘fences’ may serve to exclude competitors whereas in complex technologies, ‘thickets’ represent exchange forums for complementary technology.... yielding thickets of complementary patents held by different owners.... Patent thickets owned by various patent holders should prevail in complex technologies such as semiconductors, forcing players to use patents as ‘bargaining chips’.4 Here, from the patentee’s standpoint, exchanging technology should be the first-best use for a patent leading to the highest possible profits as exclusion is virtually infeasible.... As both articles show, the “strategic use” of patents (the two most important types being blocking and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing a major role for the latter), has classically been discussed from the perspective of those patent holders who either engage in the production of their own technological goods or consider themselves professional intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturers.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Strategic Patenting (Bad)}, thicket_def_extract={In this case, a firm with a large patent portfolio surrounding competitors’ key technologies (i.e., a “patent thicket”) has the opportunity to use its patent portfolio to lessen competition in the final goods market.17 Suppose, for example, that within a patent thicket are a number of patents of dubious merit (perhaps some were obtained through inequitable conduct) and it is costly to innovate around assertions of infringement.... Shapiro (2001) characterizes a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”... Previous research recognizes a few ways in which a patent thicket can be used to strategic advantage. First, a company can patent new technology before potential competitors, including features and technologies that it never intends to commercialize (socalled “submarine patents).21 The patent thicket creates considerable uncertainty for competitors about whether their technology infringes, especially with respect to a hidden or submarine patent. Even if a firm is not practicing submarine patents, a patent thicket makes it hard to design and sell products without running the risk of infringing on a competitor’s patent.... A patent thicket is an especially effective means of extracting concessions from rivals.},

thicket_def={def9Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Deliberate Royalty Stacking},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Making matters even more complex, many products can potentially infringe multiple patents. As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market. The need to negotiate licenses or other settlements of intellectual property disputes is made even greater because of the danger of hidden or submarine patents, which make it all too easy for a company unintentionally to infringe on a patent that was not yet issued when the company's product was designed.2 Likewise, the need to resolve intellectual property disputes is arguably made yet greatert o the extent thatt he U.S. Patenta nd TrademarkO ffice has issued "bad"p atents, i.e., patentso n technology that does not in fact meet the novelty requirements.},

thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Yet, several commentators have raised concerns that the extraordinary pace of patenting of nanotechnology5 will result in a patent deadlock6 that will stifle innovation and impede economic growth.7... Carl Shapiro defines "patent thicket" as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={Royalty fees are an inherently inefficient mechanism for pricing patents. In effect, such fees constitute an excise tax on downstream production, shifting the marginal cost of the good upward and resulting in higher prices and lower quantities for the consumers of the final product. The problem is compounded when a set of patents is required to produce the good.3 Each patent holder sets a use fee (a royalty), and since each of these acts as an excise tax on the downstream producer, the cumulative effect of several fees being charged (what Lemley and Shapiro [2007] refer to as “patent stacking”) is a higher cost of producing the good and a smaller quantity of output. The welfare losses consist of the sum of the patent holder’s lost returns, the lost profits of the downstream firm, and the consumers’ loss of surplus from the final product.... Buchanan and Yoon (2000) study the incentives inherent in pricing complementary patents and demonstrate conditions under which the price of a complementary patent bundle increases with each additional patent in the bundle. Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept as a “patent thicket” in which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the use of the patent set, uncertainty regarding potential patent infringement, and, in the limit, holdup problems.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},

abstract={This paper studies the behaviour of …firms ?firms facing the decision to create a patent fence, de…fined de?fined as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set up a patent race model, where …firms ?firms can decide either to patent their inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that fi…rms fi?rms build patent fences, when the duopoly profi…ts profi?ts net of R&D costs are positive. We also demonstrate that in this context, a fi…rm fi?rm will rely on secrecy when the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared to the competitor’scompetitor?s. Furthermore, we compare the model under the First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fences.},

thicket_def={Complementary Inputs, Single Firm}, thicket_def_extract={More precisely, …firms firms will patent a coherent group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk", aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000).... In complex product industries, where innovation is highly cumulative, ?rms use patents to force rivals into negotiations and, as a consequence, they create "thickets" of complementary technologies.},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Broad Dubious Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI)},

thicket_def={Broad Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},

thicket_def={Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic ValuePatenting (Bad), Multiple Overlapping Blocking PatentsHold-up},

thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={Scholars such as Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Carl Shapiro, and others have drawn attention—arguably too much attention—to the transactional problems created for innovators by such dispersed ownership and the density (or so-called thickets) of patents... Indeed, the plethora of IP implicated, and the resulting complex licensing required, has led some academics to despair that some sections of the economy have—or are about to—experience a “tragedy of the anticommons” (i.e., no one will use the patented technology because licensing the required technologies is simply too challenging or too expensive).},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Broad Patents, Unspecified Blocking PatentsMechanism},

thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},

thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs}, thicket_def_extract={A second phenomenon relates to the dense and fragmented genetic patent landscape. Problems arise when “patent thickets” (a web of overlapping patents through which a com- pany company must “hack” in order to commercialize a technology) emerge( 12). Accumulation, or “stacking,” of royalties that have to be paid when confronted with a patent thicket may lead to a “tragedy of the anti-commons”},

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping PatentsQuotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Anticommons effect. An effect arising from the situation where multiple owners each have the right to exclude others from the use of a resource and no one has an effective privilege of use: this results in under use of the resource [7,8].... Patent thicket. : The intellectual property portfolios of several companies that form a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rightrights... Recent studies have reported on the licensing practices of the owners of patents for genetic inventions [3–6], and concerns have been raised that patent thickets, resulting in royalty stacking (see Glossary), block access to patented technology through the accumulated license fees that a downstream inventor has to pay to upstream patent holders. Although the existence of an anticommons effect (see Glossary) of patents [7,8] has not been validated by comprehensive empirical data, it is pertinent to reflect on ways to remedy this},

thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl Shapiro... In this age of patent thickets, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools60 an organization must tread carefully lest it infringe countless patents just by doing business, 61 and Standard-Setting, an aggregate license to a large cluster of patents in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Bthe appropriate field of technology can provide peace of mind... Jaffe et al. edsThis is not the case for new entrants to the field, who are unable to transact on even grounds and are likely to find it far more difficult to penetrate the thicket without financially overextending themselves through costly licensing and search-related expenditures.However, 2001)without such expenditures they risk even more expensive litigation. },

thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping PatentsReferences Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={"Patent thickets" refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great numbers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability to any commercial product.See, e.g, Carl Shapiro,},