Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Cabral Hortacsu (2008) - Dynamics Of Seller Reputation (view source)
Revision as of 22:11, 4 April 2010
, 22:11, 4 April 2010New page: ==Reference(s)== Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics [http://www.edegan.com/pd...
==Reference(s)==
Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cabral%20Hortacsu%20(2008)%20-%20Dynamics%20of%20Seller%20Reputation.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the impor- tance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We �nd that, when a seller �rst receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the �rst one and don't have nearly as much impact as the �rst one. We also �nd that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average.
Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cabral%20Hortacsu%20(2008)%20-%20Dynamics%20of%20Seller%20Reputation.pdf pdf]
==Abstract==
We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the impor- tance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We �nd that, when a seller �rst receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the �rst one and don't have nearly as much impact as the �rst one. We also �nd that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average.
