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Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies (view source)
Revision as of 16:45, 20 July 2012
, 16:45, 20 July 2012New page: This page is referenced under: *VC Acquisitions Paper *VC Acquisitions Lit Review ==Reference== Benson, D. and Ziedonis, R.H. (2010), "Corporate venture capital and the returns t...
This page is referenced under:
*[[VC Acquisitions Paper]]
*[[VC Acquisitions Lit Review]]
==Reference==
Benson, D. and Ziedonis, R.H. (2010), "Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp.478-499 ([[Media:Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies.pdf|pdf]])
@article{benson2010corporate,
title={Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies},
author={Benson, D. and Ziedonis, R.H.},
journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
volume={98},
number={3},
pages={478--499},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier},
abstract={A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.},
filename={Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies.pdf}
}
==Abstract==
A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.
*[[VC Acquisitions Paper]]
*[[VC Acquisitions Lit Review]]
==Reference==
Benson, D. and Ziedonis, R.H. (2010), "Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp.478-499 ([[Media:Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies.pdf|pdf]])
@article{benson2010corporate,
title={Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies},
author={Benson, D. and Ziedonis, R.H.},
journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
volume={98},
number={3},
pages={478--499},
year={2010},
publisher={Elsevier},
abstract={A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.},
filename={Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies.pdf}
}
==Abstract==
A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.
