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Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control (view source)
Revision as of 18:21, 16 September 2011
, 18:21, 16 September 2011no edit summary
Programs are characterized by B, T (total benefits and total taxes). P (programs) are characterized by <math>B/T, P\in[0,\inf]</math>.
* <math>B: \{b|b_{i}>0, i=1,2,3,...,n, \sum b_{i}\leq B}</math>
* T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>.
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>.
* Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)</math>. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.
Stationarity implies members are paid their continuation value in equilibrium in exchange for their votes. <math>\delta v(g,t), \forall t\in\Tau</math>
Proposition 1: With closed rule the stationary EQM has the following properties:
* (i) Inefficient pork barrel programs will be adopted. Inefficiency is increasing in <math>n</math>
* (ii) Possible set of programs is increasing in <math>\delta</math>.
* (iiii) coalitions are minimum winning.
* (iv) There is proposal power.
* (v) 1st proposal is always selected.
