PHDBA602 (Theory of the Firm)

PHDBA602 is a (for credit) Directed Studies course, that doctoral students can use to develop their own courses with a professor. This page provides information about a directed study course with Steve Tadelis on that centers arounds models that provide theories of the firm.

Format

The format is:

• One, perhaps two, models per class
• One class per week, with a timeslot TBD.
• The student will write up the model ahead of time (on this wiki)
• The class will be used to:
  • Discuss intricacies of the model
  • Discuss modelling choices, with a view to helping the student understand how to build models
  • Place the model in the context of the broader literature

Papers

General Overviews

• Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf (stub)
• Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. pdf

Background Literature

• Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 pdf (stub)
• Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. pdf (stub)

Transaction Cost Economics

• Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 pdf (stub)
• Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
• Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. pdf
• Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 pdf
• Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. pdf

Property Rights Model

• Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf (stub)
• Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 pdf (stub)

Multi-tasking

• Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf (stub)

Centralization/Decentralization:

• Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
• Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf

Relational Contracting:

• Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999) "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 pdf
• Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 pdf

Firm Boundaries:

• Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
• Holmstrom, Bengt (1999), "The Firm As A Subeconomy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. pdf

Adaptation

• Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006), "Adaptive Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 pdf
• Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001), "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 pdf